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ABSTRACT
Identity, though deeply personal, has often been exploited by the ruling class in order to
gain power over their subjects. The preservation of social cleavages—be they national,
ethnic, racial, religious, et cetera—is thus a matter of public policy. To ensure the
propagation of a certain identity, the state must rely on its current citizens to reproduce the
social structures that give their identities value. In order to maintain boundaries between
the factions, groups must remain “pure” lest these structures be challenged. While
prohibitions on whom an individual can marry exist across systems, they take on different,
more subtle forms in the modern era. In the Middle East, legal approaches to marriage often
emulate the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, in which religious communities have
jurisdiction over their adherents in affairs relating to personal status. Using Israel as a case
study, this paper explores the careful negotiation that occurs when a legal system attempts
to incorporate religious law into civil law, which naturally presents both practical and
ideological challenges. A country less than a century old, Israel is home to a complex social
hierarchy of various ethnic and religious groups, a social hierarchy in which one’s ethnic
or religious identification is often cross-cutting with his socioeconomic status, level of
education, and presumed loyalty to the state. It is also a social hierarchy that despite—or
maybe because—of its complexities is quite rigid. Due to the state’s delegation of personal
status to the religious courts, the religious demographics of the state, and the fact that all
of Israel’s religious authorities have prohibitions against marrying a member of another
faith, interfaith marriage remains an impossibility for most, with even informal recognition
being difficult to obtain. Israel has capitalized on the forced segregation imposed by the
millet system and used as means of demographic regulations, despite its infringement on
the right to choose one’s own romantic partner.
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I. Introduction

On August 17, 2014, Morel Malka, a Jewish-born convert to Islam, married Palestinian
Mahmoud Mansour in Israel while a crowd of 200 protested, enraged over their “mixed”
marriage1. On June 18, 2020, I, the daughter of a couple in some places considered
interfaith, married an Egyptian man whose ID says Muslim. Our relationship thus far has
brought different feelings from different sides of the family, with his side deeply bothered
by the apparent religious difference. Even though we are both atheists, and even though
Muslim men can marry Jewish women, we too have forever been labeled an “interfaith”
couple by his family and colleagues in Cairo, a label that brings negative connotations
with it. In both cases, the individuals getting married were technically practicing the same
religion yet viewed by the society around them to have such conflicting sets of values and
beliefs. But there is too a fundamental difference between the two weddings. Mine did
not have protesters, yet the Malka-Mansour stirred national controversy over both the
way in which marriage is structured in the country as well as intermarriage’s impacts on
ethnoreligious identity2.
My husband and I did not involve any religious authority in our marriage. Such is
possible in the United States and countries with similar civil institutions for marriage and
family affairs. However, such a system is far from universal. Many countries, particularly
in the Middle East, delegate marriage, divorce, and other various elements of personal
status law to the jurisdiction of the local religious institutions. Such religious sovereignty,
in which each denomination has authority over its own adherents, dates back to the millet
system of the Ottoman Empire. Its continuation is based both upon the degree of political
power the religious institutions have within the federal systems of Middle Eastern states,
as well as divisions present within national identity, which are typically split along
religious cleavages. Many religions, especially the denominations present in the region,
place limitations on whom an individual is permitted to marry, with at least some
restrictions on interfaith marriage being seen in all three of the dominant Abrahamic

Sylvie Fogiel-Bijaoui, Sleeping with the ‘Enemy’: Mixed Marriages in the Israeli Media, 36 JOURNAL
OF ISRAELI HISTORY 213 (2017). at 213.
2
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1
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faiths. In the delegation to authorities that discriminate on the basis of religion, as well as
the utter refusal to provide an alternative for couples who do not wish to be bound by
religious law, the state not only condones prejudicial practices, but actively enforces
them.
Coincidentally, in systems where such delegation to the religious authorities
occurs, marriage is often a euphemism for breeding with given the social imperative for
reproduction. As such, marriage in these countries is not about love necessarily, but about
propagation of genes, and with it, the propagation of identity. Furthermore, in many of
the systems that lack civil marriage entirely, marriage is also the only socially recognized
channel for family building. This is all the stronger when religion is a key part of both
individual identity and the collective culture. As religions often have prohibitions against
intermarriage while simultaneously teaching that sex outside of the marital context is
wrong, the growing trend in the West of granting legitimacy to unmarried, cohabitating
couples is socially infeasible. All of these sociolegal factors create an environment in
which individuals are essentially forced into endogamy. A lack of exposure to other
social groups, as well an emphasis on keeping the community “pure” and propagating
certain social ties, reinforces the idea that whatever particular group an individual comes
from is somehow relevant to the type of relationship that can be formed with that
individual. Proverbial walls go up between “them” and “us”, solidifying boundaries
between the various factions, reinforcing social hierarchies, and making upward mobility
all the more difficult for those who comprise lower rungs on the social ladder.
This paper explores the way in which social identity can be and has been utilized
by various regimes in various systems as a political tool through the use of Israel as a
case study. Be the primary source of social division within a system racial, religious,
ethnic, national, or a combination of several of these elements, similarities are
nonetheless shared, specifically when it comes to the politics of division and ensuring
that each faction remains its own distinct faction. My research question specifically
focuses on modern approaches to state interference in family formation. Seeing as
throughout history and across continents, countries have routinely prohibited, even if not
explicitly, interfaith, interracial, and other “othered” relationships, I seek to explore the
connection between the enforcement of endogamy and factional hegemony. In societies
2

with deeply engrained tensions between primary social groups, what happens when
intermarriages do occur? What ramifications would these unions, as well as the children
of these unions, have on the social hierarchy’s usage as a tool of the state? Beginning
with social identity as a generality to establish its basis as an instrument, I then focus on
the history of regulating marriage, tracing the exact means through which couples have
been denied access to the institution solely for falling outside what the state has deemed
an acceptable family construct. This then leads to the millet system, left behind by the
Ottoman Empire, whose remnants continue to ensure that interfaith couples in the Middle
East today are still unable to marry. The theoretical foundations part is finished by
literature on intermarriage and the way children of mixed parentage challenge the
conventionally accepted means of identity. All these elements come together in Part III,
where they are applied to the real-life example of Israel, a democracy whose system of
family law ensures that Jews and Arabs remain segregated.

3

II. Foundations
A. Nationalism & Social Identity

The modern era has birthed both technological and social innovations those from prior
centuries never could have imagined. However, despite this radical change, some
concepts have remained fairly constant. Throughout the history of civilization,
individuals have formed groups to separate themselves from other clusters of individuals.
Often, there were tensions, discontent, rivalry, or even full-fledged warfare between the
different groups. Whereas many scholars in the early 20th century believed that the
concept of ethnicity would be eroded “by modernity, by the maturation of the nationstate, and by the globalization of industrial capitalism3”, ethnic divides and desire to
maintain identity are as strong as ever. The traditional theories surrounding the creation
of social identity—being the umbrella term under which national, ethnic, and religious
identity are included—primarily consisted of primordialism, constructivism, and the less
popular instrumentalism4.
Primordialism is the idea the ethnic ties are automatic, a “birthright” based upon
one’s descent. According to Geertz (1973), primordialism is comprised of two primary
views: “1) individuals have a single ethnic identity and 2) this identity is fixed in the
present and future,” with where exactly this identity comes from remaining uncertain5.
Therefore, while analyzing ethnic relations through a primordialist lens, caution is
emphasized due to the idea that a level of commonality is inherently shared between
members of an ethnic group. Though once popular amongst scholars, it has largely fallen
out of favor in recent decades due to its essentialist nature. Constructivism as a school of
thought arose largely as a counter to the primordialist stance. Providing a framework that
allows for change, Chandra (2001) defines constructivism as being built upon two core

3

John L. Comaroff, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution, in THE
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE: ETHNIC PREMISES IN A WORLD OF POWER 162 (1996). at 162.
4
Id. at 164.
5
CHANDRA, KANCHAN 2001 ‘Introduction’, APSA-CP: Newsletter of the Organized
Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association, vol. 12, no. 1, p. 7 – 11. At
7.
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views which directly oppose the tenets of primordialism: “individuals have multiple, not
single, ethnic identities; and second, the identity with which they identify varies
depending upon some specified causal variable. Changes in the value of these causal
variables are likely to lead to changes in individual identifications6”. While there are
several different constructivist approaches with regards to ethnic identity, the theory as a
whole has been criticized by scholars such a Comaroff who bluntly states that “it is
simply not a theory, merely a broad assertion to the effect that social identities are
products of human agency7”. Meanwhile, instrumentalism, as the name implies, perceives
ethnic ties to be little more than a tool, or, more appropriately, an instrument, that can and
is used rationally for either group or personal gain, particularly in terms of political
power8. Taken out of an economic and/or political context, instrumentalism gives little
value to the concept of ethnicity. One can claim to be part of a group, but without the
surrounding structure that provides a definition of said identification, the impact of those
ties on the individual’s life have little meaning. Within the appropriate context, however,
exactly which group or groups one belongs to may have a great level of influence over
his life, be it in terms of affluence or power. One group is privileged over the others,
which in turn solidifies personal attachment to identities, be it in support of the status quo
or in opposition to it.
The polarity presented by the aforementioned theories has naturally given way to
combination theories, most notably the idea of neo-primordialism, best described by John
Comaroff (1996):
[Neo-primordialism] holds that ethnic consciousness is a universal potentiality which is
only realized—objectified, that is, into an assertive identity—under specific conditions;
viz. as a reaction, on the part of the community, to threats against its integrity or interest.
From this perspective, ethnicity is not a thing in (or for) itself, but an immanent capacity
which takes on manifest form in response to external forces9.

He then goes on to say that in order to successfully be used as an instrument, the
instrument in question must have some unifying aspects that resonant with the people
with whom support is trying to be garnered. Comaroff, however, is not explicitly
6
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advocating for neo-primordialism, or any single theory for that matter. Rather, he
emphasizes the need to contextualize different scenarios, and that advancing a blanket
discourse will routinely run an author into the trap of essentialism.
While this paper does not endorse a single theory of national identity formation to
be applicable to every context, it does rely heavily on the theory of neo-primordialism in
the analysis of the case study in Chapter III. Combining elements of primordialism and
instrumentalism, this theory does not entirely discredit the primordial view that aspects of
identity may feel intrinsic to the members of the collective in question. Rather, it simply
asserts that race, ethnicity, nationality, et cetera, as well as social divides built upon these
differences can only exist when the group as a collective faces an external threat,
particularly one from an outside group. After all, an individual cannot choose where/into
what social group they are born. At the same time, neo-primordialism acknowledges that
international society is not a college admissions brochure in which everyone is multiethnic and happy for it. There are legitimate social divides that classify individuals into
easily discernable groups that make it easier to gain political authority through an “us
versus them” discourse. In order for such discourse to be derived, the social rifts must
already be present within a given society.
Taking a neo-primordial approach to the powers of Medieval Europe, Anthony
Marx looks at how the birth of the modern nation-state in Europe was achieved through
the creation of a national identity that centered largely on the exclusion of others. A
transition to capitalism brought with it new structures of governance and totally changed
the relationships ordinary subjects had with those who ruled them. Whereas authority
over the masses had previously come from a local, feudal lord, the shift to a modern
concept of a centralized state brought many different ethnic/religious groups together
across large swaths of territory. With these factions now compatriots, there had to be a
way to unify the masses so that either those in power could maintain their position or so
that any opposition could grow powerful enough to seize power for themselves. One of
the ways of doing this was to capitalize upon rather than try to erode existing ethnic or
religious differences within a state, sacrificing favor of a particular minority and using
said minority as a basis against which to build popular support:

6

Those seeking greater popular allegiance and obedience to the state (or opposition to it),
facing the imperative to build toward national cohesion, often found that amid conflict
they could not do so easily or inclusively. They then fitfully embraced the logic of
bolstering selective unity via exclusion, learning to focus that exclusion on heretics found
within, resolving conflict accordingly. And to many at particular times, such sentiment
felt 'natural.' Nationalism thus began to emerge by piggybacking on the passion of
religious conflicts, which thereby cohered a core religious faith in the secular realm.
Religion, both conflicts, over it and exclusions, accordingly, was then central to early
nation-building as the most prominent collective 'focal point' of allegiance10.

For the first time, average citizens were seen as political units, and it was thus upon them
to grant their governments, typically and in Marx’s case studies, monarchs, legitimacy to
rule. Looking at the European context may appear problematic for this piece, particularly
given the fact that the countries Marx most engages with—England, France, and Spain—
later became colonial powers, and so the historical context between Marx’s cases and my
own are quite different. As will hopefully be made clear in the following subsections,
however, a similar tactic was employed in colonial Africa, the Ottoman Empire, and has
lasted in various government structures to this day.
Marx’s application of neo-primordialism to Premodern Europe is paralleled to
Kelman’s analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, wherein both ethnic groups have
used negation of the other as a key source in deriving a collective identity. At the heart of
Kelman’s piece is the emphasis on the constructed nature of group identity. In order to
explain how an ethnic/national group can define itself against others, there must be some
artificial nature to the concept of group identity as a whole. Similarly, the ways in which
relationships are negotiated—be they personal as a member of a particular collective
negotiates and incorporates his identity into everyday life, between members of the
collective with each other, between the members and their means of governance, or the
ways in which members interact with outsiders—must have some level of fluidity.
Kelman explains:
[Identities] can be redefined because they are to a large extent constructed. To view
national identity as a social construction does not imply that it is manufactured out of
nothing….Generally, the social construction draws on a variety of authentic elements
held in common within a group….[but] the social construction of identity implies a
degree of arbitrariness and flexibility in the way the identity is composed (which
elements are admitted into it and which is omitted from it) and in what its boundaries are
10

ANTHONY W. MARX, FAITH IN NATIONALISM: EXCLUSIONARY ORIGINS OF NATIONALISM (2003). at 77.
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(who is included and who is excluded). These choices depend on the opportunities and
necessities perceived by the elites that are engaged in mobilizing ethnonational
consciousness for their political, economic, or religious purposes.11

Through the acknowledgment of identity as not just a social tool, but a political tool, it
becomes apparent that the concept itself is not as concrete as people—and their political
leaders—have a tendency to make it. Nationality and religion are considered to be fixed
by the members who adhere to these identities, but history shows that this is not the case.
Borders change, as does the world outside of those borders from whence other
perspectives can be adopted by local populaces. Religion too, through becoming integral
to national and/or cultural norms, can and does change as new interpretations of the faith
are adopted and different tenets gain or lose importance among adherents.
Looking at the African continent’s history of colonialism, Mahmood Mamdani
(1996) explores the ways in which ethnic/racial/tribal distinctions amongst indigenous
populations were used as a tool in establishing colonial rule. Situating himself in the
debate between modernists, who advocate for a civil, rights-based society, and
communitarians, who emphasize cultural/tribal sovereignty, Mamdani asserts that neither
position can on its own provide a framework comprehensive enough for understanding
the postcolonial African context. Prior to the colonial encounter, communities operated
according to their own, naturally varied, structures, yet said structures were quite
different from the modern, Eurocentric version of law seen throughout the continent
today. During the period of colonial rule, the powers in question created a legal duality,
one with a civil system governed by the colonial state ruling over the territory in
question, and one that was overseen by and applied to natives12. While tribal affiliations
had existed long before Europeans came to the continent, the duality implemented did not
preserve local authority, but rather transformed it into a code that could be reconciled
with the colonial legal systems.

Herbert C. Kelman, National Identity and the Role of the “Other” in Existential Conflicts: The IsraeliPalestinian Case, in ISLAM, JUDAISM, AND THE POLITICAL ROLE OF RELIGIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 61
(John Bunzl ed., 2004). at 65 – 66.
12
MAHMOUD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE
LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996). at 22.
11
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In order to secure power in a system in which nationals from the colonizing state
were such a small minority, the colonizing state first had to ensure that any potential
unity amongst the indigenous populations in an area was fractured. Thus, a system of
customary law was established and applied along racial lines13, with explicit content of
the law differentiated according to the standards of the tribes in question. Playing upon
ethnic pluralism—for which, it should be noted, the groups in question were not
necessarily in conflict or saw themselves as “othered” from their fellow indigenous
groups—was a strategic move, in that “the way to stabilize racial domination (territorial
segregation) was to ground it in a politically enforced system of ethnic pluralism
(institutional segregation), so that everyone, victims no less than beneficiaries, may
appear as minorities14”. Local populations, now fragmented, then became preoccupied
with preserving their identities against other indigenous groups, rather than the
indigenous population as a whole forming their collective identity against the colonial
regime, collective action which may have posed a threat to the ruling colonial power. The
debate over the degree to which former colonial states should “modernize” is an intense
one, yet Mamdani’s analysis highlights that no matter how much one disavows Western
legal ideals, they will still permeate into the most communitarian of societies as the
communitarian, tribal institutions that exist today are too products of the colonial
enterprise15.
On a macro level, nationalism/national identity is merely another means of social
categorization, so to understand it, it is important to understand the nature of collective
identity, and with it, the nature of individual identity as well. After all, no group can exist
without a collection of individuals both to comprise the group, and to comprise other
groups from which the first can define themselves. According to Côté and Levine,
“difficulties with identity formation processes are so widespread they are now being
considered ‘normal’ in many respects….people lack a sense of self-definition rooted in a
community of others, which was the basis of human identity throughout history16”.

Id. at 109 – 110.
Id. at 6.
15
Id. at 26.
16
JAMES E. COTE & CHARLES G. LEVINE, IDENTITY, FORMATION, AGENCY, AND CULTURE:
A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS (2002). at 2.
13
14
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According to the authors, the history of human society can roughly be divided into three
categories—premodern, early modern, and late modern—for which individual identity
and the social prescriptions of such interacted. In premodern societies, i.e., prior to
industrialization, identity was ascribed to the individuals who lived within a given
society. As populations became increasingly urban, social identity became something one
sought to accomplish, to work towards in order to assume an acceptable role within the
social constructs in which he lived. In the period in which we currently live, the late
modern, societal expectations of the role one fills is managed with the personal decisions
about how we live our lives. Identity as part of a group, as a culture, is now often seen as
a burden rather than a goal. To quote Côté and Levine directly:
In late modern societies, therefore, social identities are much more precarious than ever
before. As opposed to being a birthright, or a sinecured social achievement, one’s
legitimacy can be continually called into question. In order to find a social location to
begin with, one often has to convince a community of strangers that one is worthy of
their company, and their acceptance can be challenged at virtually any moment17.

Our society, the authors argue, is currently image-oriented, implying that it is not our
own perceptions of our identity that matters, but rather the way those around us perceive
it. Identity as the individual expresses it often conflicts with identity as those around the
individual prescribe it must be. This may not be an entirely new concept in that the social
context is what has always assigned value to identity. But in the postmodern era,
individuals, given access to seemingly unlimited perspectives, feel that they must prove
themselves as part of the collective because now, everyone is aware that not being part of
said particular collective is an option. The anxiety generated by the prospects of not
“fitting in” makes it all the easier for states weaponize identity to turn social factions
against one another.
But—typically—law and policy are not determined by individuals acting as
individuals. This must be done on a group level. The two realms, the individual and the
collective, have long been presented as dichotomous to one another, but are also highly
dependent on one another as no group can exist without individual members. For large
groups defined by characteristics such as nationality, ethnicity, and/or religious
affiliation, the individuals themselves help to shape the collective expression of their
17

Id. at 126.
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group while simultaneously having their very individualities shaped by the standards of
the collective(s) to which they belong18. This is why the cultural standards of a society
can change. Change, however, becomes more difficult when criteria for membership
requires adherence to certain values or way of life, as is the case with religion, where
there are rules governing everything from marriage to financial regulations to dietary
restrictions. There is less room for challenging standards when membership is based upon
behavior rather than birthright, as is the case when social divisions are based upon
ethnicity or race. Modern nationalism, particularly in heterogenous countries, and even
more so when there is a perceived threat again the nation, plays by similar rules. The idea
of “our culture”, “our tradition”, that “this is who we are, this is what has been done, and
because it has been done this way, it must continue to be done as such” is powerful
precisely because the consensus of the collective helps to shape the personality of the
individual. In ensuring that being part of the collective requires acting in a certain
manner, the status quo is better solidified, so long as the individuals who make up said
collective prioritize continuation of their “membership” over opposing the standards in
place.
Though it was long predicted that modernity would bring about the end of the
division caused by nationalism, looking at the world today, it is evident that the concept
has survived. Seemingly as well, the weapon of nationalism once utilized solely by
armies of the elite—i.e., monarchies and colonial powers—has spread to the general
public, allowing it to become a populist opposition tool. Writing towards the end of the
Cold War, Anderson notes that “since World War II every successful revolution has
defined itself in national terms...and, in doing so, has grounded itself firmly in a territorial
and social pace inherited from the pre-revolutionary past19”. Positioned somewhere
closest to instrumentalism on the spectrum of theory of nationalist formation, Anderson
removes the nefarious connotations from his view. Admitting the artificial, or imagined,
to reference the title of this particular work, nature of communities, he refrains from

18

Tom Postmes et al., The Dynamics of Personal and Social Identity Formation, in INDIVIDUALITY AND
179 (2006). at 187.
19
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SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983). at 2.
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using language implying that such social groups were “invented” rather than “created”.
The former implies that such construction was wrong, and as a result, that there is a right
way for them to form. Instead, he chooses to believe there are merely differences in “the
style in which they are imagined20” that can be attributed to cultural roots present in a
particular group. Regardless of the nature of their creation, however, the idea that identity
belongs to masses as well as the elite is quite an empowering one, even though it means
the exact same thing according to Anderson as it does to Marx: that identity can be used
as a political too. It is an artificial concept with very real consequences.
We are far from the end of nationalism, yet a social shift is occurring. Having
explored the evolution of individual identity over recent centuries, we can now track the
changes in identity as a collective enterprise over more or less the same time frame.
Anderson comments on this extensively as well. While collectivism currently manifests
itself most commonly on the level of the nation-state, this has not always been the case.
Through and into the Middle Ages, across the known world, borders, though in existence,
were weak, and governates often blurred into one another. The people who lived in these
governates were governed over, but not actively considered political entities like the
individual citizen is today. Those who ruled over them did not have to give much weight
to the will of the people, as it was understood that the right to rule came from God/gods,
in whatever form was popular in the area in that given time period. Commonly
understood languages, at least amongst the elite, ruling and literate classes, were those of
religious texts. Latin dominated the Christian World over the vernacular French, Italian,
and Spanish. Arabic unified the Islamic World, and Confucianism, though not a faith per
se, spread Chinese throughout much of East Asia. This is why, to borrow an example
directly from Anderson, that medieval artwork portraying scenes from the Bible often
feature subjects with European features and style of dress despite originally occurring in
modern Palestine. The concept of “us versus them” was not based so much upon
territoriality, but upon conscious belief.
However, around the beginning of colonization, the use of a lingua franca uniting
religious communities sharply declined in popularity, replaced with vernacular languages
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spoken only in a certain geographic area21. A greater reliance on less commonly
understood languages required the translation of texts previously untranslated, religious
texts being among them, which further enforced the new concept of a community based
upon location as a common location equaled a common language or dialect. This
community was called the nation, and it continued temporally:
The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty
time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid
community moving steadily down (or up) history. An American will never meet, or even
know the names of more than a handful of his 240,000,000- [now 330,000,000] odd
fellow-Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to any one time. But he has
complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity22.

It is not surprising that nationalism took hold at the same time as individualism. Whereas
community based upon religion knowingly accepted a fixed hierarchy—God appointed a
worthy leader to which common people answered too—a community based upon
geography/ethnicity allowed common people the hope of rising in social status. This
newfound hope was occurred simultaneously with the rise of capitalism. As the social
order was no longer predetermined, responsibility was placed on the individual to make
his place in his national society. This was the likely catalyst behind the shift from identity
being prescribed—“it is God’s will you be disenfranchised”—to something one sought to
achieve—“if you work hard enough, you will no longer be disenfranchised”. Under the
nation-state, individuals were promised a chance to rise through the levels of the
hierarchy while still clinging to the same promise of continuity originally only offered by
religion.
During pre- and early modern times when collective identity was either prescribed
or something that a person aimed to be part of, the price of conformity, was worth the
sense of belonging it brought, if it were even ever discovered that an alternative existed.
The individuals wanted to be part of a collective, specifically a national or religious
group and usually the collective to which they were born. Whether it be capitalism
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spawning a more individualistic society, individual ease of communication and travel,
bringing with it access to a range of different perspectives, or global cooperation on a
macro level, there is no longer the mass loyalty to the preexisting norms. Individual
attachment to the collectives an individual is born too is weakening, so too are the
collectives as collectives. The rates of active membership turns out to be less than the
demographic projections of previous generations would have indicated. The limited
amount of members left would likely also be more traditional, seeing as changing the
standards of the group is often more difficult than leaving the group entirely, which in
turn would make an out-reach approach to garner new membership even more difficult
than it may have been had more moderate stances been present.

B. The Regulation of Marriage

As borders became stronger, so too did those who ruled over them. Emphasis on kingdom
boundaries combined with the new market regulations brought governments control over
an entire “public” sphere. Conforming to this framework, everything considered outside
of sovereign power then became “private”23. Family was considered the most private
domain24, for it is through the family both physical reproduction and the reproduction of
identity take place. Modern scholarship however no longer believes the public and
private realms to be that distinct from one another25, and the relationship between the
family and the state underscores how intimately connected the two spheres are. Family
law exceptionalism is the idea that the “family and family law are often treated as
occupying a unique and autonomous domain…they are unique because they preserve
(against modernity and/or the global or foreign) the traditional, the national, the
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indigenous26”.Yet, the family is regulated. Members of families are still individuals tied
to government institutions and the market27. The very formation of the family too is
regulated through the institution of marriage. If the private sphere refers to elements of
society outside the control of the state, then any element the state does have authority
over cannot be within the private sphere.
The cornerstone of nearly every family law system is a basis upon which to
construct the family, either marriage or some equivalent form of relationship recognition.
Any system that grants a formal system of relationship recognition implements
parameters regarding what combinations of partners are eligible for that recognition.
Apart from being subjected to anti-miscegenation laws, prior to the 1870s, marriage was
once considered a private matter with sparse government oversight. Little to no
documentation of the union was the norm, and courts throughout the United States
presumed marriage in cases where no evidence for or against the relationship’s validity
was present28. At the time, this system of not having a system most benefited the state in
its protection of public morality—aligning with national identity and thus a means of
control—while serving economic interests. Upon the cessation of financial support from
the male breadwinner, such as in the case of his death, otherwise unwed mothers and
illegitimate children would only be allowed to inherit, and therefore sustain themselves, if
the presumption of a formal union was present. Seeing as inheritance is a private matter
involving no payout on the part of the state, ensuring the continuation of such private
economic support29 prevented countless women and children from becoming destitute
and/or the state’s problem, all while maintaining the social standard said cohabitation and
illegitimate children were immoral.
But marriage, even if considered private, has long been restricted to couples
whose social groups were supposed to stay distinct. A common element of regulations on
who could marry whom is that they were adopted in response to a perceived social threat.
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At a time in which economic growth was paramount to capitalist, newly industrial
societies, the makeup of the family became more politically relevant, more restricted,
more about society at large, and therefore more public. Increasing rates of poverty,
medical knowledge on heredity ailments and cognitive impairments, as well as more
frequent interactions between members of different racial, ethnic, and religious groups
led to fees for registering a marriage and prohibitions on marriages between certain types
of people, such as the mentally handicapped and interracial couples30. The reason behind
this shift is best explained by Michel Foucault:
One of the great techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of
‘population’ as an economic and political problem: population as wealth, population as
manpower or labor capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the
resources it commanded….a ‘population’, with its specific phenomena and its peculiar
variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility….At the heart of this economic
and political problem was sex31.

As scientific discourse crafted widely accepted definitions of “normal” and “abnormal”
cognitive and behavioral ability32, ensuing that such conditions did not enter the gene
pool became a major sociopolitical concern. New knowledge of the hereditary nature of
certain conditions coupled by the economic disadvantages faced by those who had them
made it within the interests of the state to prohibit the propagation of abnormal genetics.
A group previously somewhat integrated into greater American society suddenly found
themselves othered, deprived of a privilege that had been a right prior to government
regulation.
Anti-immigration rhetoric during this same time period lead to a social panic of
intermarriage between American citizens and new immigrants, lest the American identity
be lost, as well. Bemoaning the decline in birth rates of the native-born white population
at the turn of the century, President Theodore Roosevelt wrote “‘It is lamentable…to see
this Puritan conscience, this New England conscience, so atrophied, so diseased and
warped, as not to recognize that the fundamental, the unpardonable crime against the race
is the crime of race suicide33”. The fear of losing one’s cultural identity to assimilation is
not unique to the United States at this period either, and much of the language invoked is
30
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still the same, as will be explored in more detail later. For the sake of this section, I wish
to juxtapose Foucault’s exploration of the people as a population, as well as need for
racial purity, with a quote by Rachel Moran, a scholar on the rationale behind antimiscegenation laws in the United States:
Here, I would first like to focus on a time of great social and sexual ferment in the United
States, the period in the late 1800s and early 1900s when America was experiencing rapid
industrialization and urbanization. So long as most Americans lived in small, rural
communities, neighbors could keep a close eye on sexual liaisons, and wedding banns
would give the entire village a chance to reflect on the soundness of a match. As the
population shifted to large, impersonal cities, these informal ways of regulating sex and
marriage broke down. Suddenly, anonymity gave urban Americans unprecedented
opportunities for sexual experimentation and subjected them to unprecedented dangers of
sexual predation and marital fraud34.

Demographics, not necessarily relating to ethnicity, became a matter of state economic
policy, at the same time urbanization brought threats to traditional moral standards.
Populations grew to numbers never seen before, with population centers growing even
faster. For the first time, the state risked having too many people while they had
previously been worried about having too few. The lack of community surveillance
combined with new governmental interests lead to surveillance through law. One of the
ways in which to do this was through making marriage a legal institution.
When marriage became regulated by the state, some of the first and most widespread restrictions implemented was that on marriage between people of different races.
The legal prohibitions sought to accomplish two goals: 1) permanent segregation of the
races and 2) continued subordination of politically targeted minority groups. Within the
American context, many states adopted anti-miscegenation laws aimed at preventing
marriages between black and white individuals, as well as couples comprised of one
white and one Asian partner. Anti-miscegenation laws targeting Native Americans and
Latinos were rare in the former case and non-existent in the latter35—though stigmas
persisted that may have impacted how commonly such marriages actually occurred—
intentional discrepancies crafted to service social agendas. Native Americans and Latinos
were indigenous racial groups in the Americas, and as such, it was in the interest of white
34
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society for those races to integrate into the white establishment. Early Asian communities
in the continental United States were primarily Chinese male migrants, allowed into the
country on a short-term basis to fulfill a need for labor. As such, policies were
implemented to ensure that the men would eventually leave the country, including
forbidding their marriage to white women36. The most strict, and most common, laws
against interracial marriage were aimed at those between blacks and whites, the result of
centuries of slavery that ingrained a monstrous image of black men into the minds of
white Americans from which white women must be protected, both for their sake as
individuals and for the future of the white collective. In codifying these stigmas into law,
they were legitimized, and thus the inferiority of blacks and the necessity of segregation
were further cemented into American institutions.
The debate over the recognition of same-sex marriage has raged in Western
political systems since the late 1990s. While I try not to discuss these unions too in-depth
in attempt to avoid conflation between productive and non-productive relationships, the
rationale behind restricting access to the institution of marriage indicates that marriage is
more than simply a means of producing the next generation. It is precisely because these
relationships—presuming monogamy and a lack of medical intervention—cannot
produce children. If protecting the social conditioning of children were the only reason
for restricting who an individual is allowed to marry, same-sex couples would have been
able to secure access to the institution much easier than they did, with debates
surrounding adoption rights and access to reproductive technologies being more highly
contested than marriage equality. Not having children equals no flaw in conditioning,
meaning that there is no ground to prohibit people of the same sex from marrying one
another unless marriage as marriage means something greater than marriage solely for the
purposes of childrearing. Exploring the rationale behind opposition to expanding access
to the institution of marriage, François compares prohibitions of same-sex marriage to
prohibitions on marriage between slaves:
My thesis in this Article is that the ban on slave marriage was rooted in a fundamental
refusal to provide social recognition to the humanity of slaves. By contrast, opposition to
interracial marriage had less to do with a denial of the humanity of the individuals
involved, than with a desire to defend against the political and economic threat to white
36
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supremacy that interracial marriage posed….such opposition [to same-sex marriage], like
the ban on slave marriage, is rooted in a refusal to make equal space for gay couples in
our national identity.37

Seeing as prior to emancipation, slaves were not considered legal persons, they could not
enter into contractual arrangements, including formalized marriages. Naturally, family
formation occurred, but the family in question had no protections or status, with nuclear
families often being forcibly separated or even constructed38. Upon emancipation,
however, former slaves were often encouraged to marry in order to conform to the moral
order of the country39. Quickly, formal marriage and laws concerning the family became
important to the rights of newly emancipated persons, as access to such institutions
confirmed their personhood status, serving as yet another step to full citizenship while
ensuring that these new legal persons conformed to the collective moral order.
While the historical treatment of salves and homosexuals is clearly very different,
a long lack of legal status is shared between them. Homosexuals—aside from those who
were also slaves—have always enjoyed legal personhood, but so long as their sexual
activity was illegal, any relationship also lacked the chance for legal status. Seeing as the
ability to form a family had such an established history as a basic right of persons, being
barred from the institution of marriage was direct comment to their inferiority within the
social hierarchy. Legal persons, yes, but not quite deserving of the rights of full legal
persons. With no single “emancipation” to speak of, the timeline of the marriage equality
movement aligns with François’s comparison. In 2003, the Supreme Court decision of
Lawrence v. Texas struck down any state law criminalizing consensual same-sex activity.
The following year, Massachusetts became the first state in the country to legalize samesex marriage. Barely more than a decade later, in 2015, same-sex marriage was legalized
in every state that had not already done so. It was a quick legal development that
followed a much more gradual cultural shift, following a pattern similar to the marriage
rights of slaves. The marriages of former slaves, though reproductive, were also similar to
same-sex marriages in that they did not pose the same demographic threat as interracial
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marriage because anti-miscegenation laws were already in effect, thus preventing newly
emancipated former slaves from marrying outside their race, ensuring that the racial
groups within American society would continue as they had for centuries prior. Unlike
the previous restrictions discussed, prohibitions on both slave and same-sex marriages
were about what other peoples’ children thought—i.e., that the next generation would
view these classes as people with the same disdain their parents did—than the actual
children being produced.
On the topic of same-sex marriage is too the topic of the alternative to marriage
long proposed and adopted in many places: civil unions, domestic partnerships, and
reciprocal beneficiaries. More or less the same legal arrangement, civil unions
traditionally offered the greatest amount of rights to couples, followed by domestic
partnerships and then reciprocal beneficiaries40, the third having been present in only one
state, Hawaii, which was also the first state to extend any kind of relationship recognition
to same-sex couples. The exact rights awarded by these unions varied depending on the
state—or country, as such alternative arrangements to marriage were not unique to the
United States—but included at least some rights previously restricted to married partners
such as hospital visitation and funeral leave41. This approach, long seen as a compromise
on the political issue of marriage equality, was short-lived, only lasting in its various
forms for a total of 22 years. Even in states where civil unions were equal to marriages in
terms of rights and duties, such as Connecticut42, it was marriage, equal to the institution
awarded to opposite-sex couples both in name and practicality, that the Supreme Court
mandated be extended to same-sex couples43. When the family is defined by marriage
according to the law, not to mention the real, though hard to quantify significance of
being married, anything less than marriage is not equal to marriage, specifically when the
very reason behind the existence of these alternative structures was to deny what was
already in existence.

40

Ian Curry-Sumner & Scott Curry-Sumner, Is the Union Civil? Same-Sex Marriages, Civil Unions,
Domestic Partnerships and Reciprocal Benefits in the USA, 4 UTRECHT LAW REVIEW 236 (2008). at
243, 245.
41
Id. at 244 – 245.
42
Id. at 255.
43
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

20

C. The Millet System

Throughout much of the former Ottoman Empire, a millet-like approach remains in place.
Originally adopted to solve a logistical problem of multiple religious communities over
vast swaths of territory while maintaining Islamic hegemony, such an approach puts
marriage and other elements of personal status law under the jurisdiction of the religious
law to which the individual in question belongs. In cases where petitioning parties
belonged to different religions, Islamic law would apply, and the case would be handled
before the shari’a courts. While protection of the rights of religious minorities may not
have been the primary rationale behind the millet system, granting communities a degree
of self-rule may in and of itself provided some protections to them, at least at the
collective level44, particularly when compared to the approach by European powers at
that time. However, allowing minorities to exist does not mean that they were treated
equally, and deeply entrenched social hierarchies existed between the factions in a given
area. In systems that continue to utilize a millet style approach, questions over the
fairness of such hierarchies, the rights of the individual(s) who make up the collective, as
well as certain tenets of enforced religious law are matters of intense debate.
Even in countries that have done away with the millet system, its remnants remain
powerful. Tracing the history of the Church’s power from pre- to post-independent
Greece, Tsoukala highlights how in order to become independent, Greeks needed a
national culture behind which to mobilize. As the Orthodox Church was the only national
institution that had enjoyed some degree of autonomy under the Ottoman Empire, it
quickly became conflated with the Greek Nation and culture45, and was thus able to use
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this tradition to secure authority upon independence. Legitimacy and power were both
further solidified by the new lack of alternative family law. Under Ottoman Rule,
conversion had been option for Greek Christians and to avoid losing too many followers,
the Church had to be less strict in its application of religious doctrine46. The Church was
freed from these constraints once it no longer had to answer to an authority of a different
faith or its citizenry being part of a more diverse greater population. With the Church's
new monopoly over family law, as well as the newfound power that culture, i.e., the
Church, held in the post-independence era, going forward, "family law became a domain
in which any reform had to be justified in terms of tradition or modernity47". As the
country began to integrate into a pan-European structure in the 20th century, the idea that
Greece too belonged to a general European structure of civilization served as a
justification for reforms made in the realm of family law, such as the creation of a civil
system of marriage and the abolition of the dowry, both in 198348. No matter which
culture Greeks belonged to—a Greek or an umbrella “European” one—it appears as if an
idea must be established in history and tradition in order to be considered legitimate.
For other former Ottoman countries, the political power of the religious
authorities is even greater than in Greece, as religion played the same role in nationalist
movements while retaining their jurisdiction over personal status matters upon formal
statehood. Not merely a legal leftover from a previous regime, in continuing to give the
religious authorities such legal power, the state actively condones unity of religion and
state, touting group rights while simultaneously having policies that supersede some
tenets, even the tenets of the majority/most influential religious authority. These states
have the authority to place restrictions on marriage, including minimum age requirements
and the prohibition of polygamy. A public matter in such systems, there is still a legal
hierarchy. Therefore, like many elements of family law, religion here too becomes a
public matter. The state could easily adopt a system that would give its citizens a greater
degree of freedom of choice, both in terms of their partner and under what laws their
marriage would be subjected to. The fact that they do not, coupled by the fact that most
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institutionalized religions in the region do not permit interfaith marriages, means that the
state creates a barrier to the institution of marriage on the basis of religion. In simple
terms, it is religious discrimination.

D. Intermarriage’s Threat to Identity by Exclusion
Thus far, terms such as “intermarriage” and “endogamy” have been used quite generally
for a specific reason. According to Törngren, Irastorza, and Song, literature on
intermarriage can be divided into three categories: likelihood and patterns of
intermarriage, intermarriage and migration, and intermarriage and social integration49.
This paper will focus primarily on the third category, with elements of the first being
incorporated for statistical purposes. Within each of these scopes, literature is often
conflicting, particularly with regards to the impact such crossing of boundaries has on the
individuals’ status within his or her society’s social hierarchies. Depending on the field of
study through which research is conducted, a variety of different terms can be employed
to describe the exact difference being analyzed, such as “interfaith”, “interracial”,
“transnational”, and “cross-cultural”50. One of the main issues with analyzing
intermarriage’s role in the formation/evolution of identity is the task of determining
exactly which combination of partner backgrounds are deserving of the “inter-” prefix.
This, naturally, depends on the context in question, seeing as intermarriage “is not a
question of what, but also when and where’51”. Taking into account the level of tension
that exists between groups and the way in which the system in question defines concepts
of race and ethnicity, dividing lines between social factions can take place across a wide
variety of cleavages off of which endo- and exogamy can be defined. There too can be
varying results when looking at intermarriage and the absorption of immigrant groups
into a native society as opposed to intermarriage and the social cohesion between two
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distinct native populaces. Similarly, with the decline in marriage in certain parts of the
world, the term has also expanded to include other means of long-term coupling,
particularly with regards to relationships which could result in the propagation of
identity.
The exact implications high rates of intermarriage can have on a society too vary
a great deal depending on the society in which the marriage is occurring as well as the
specific demographic variations the couples represent, as is highlighted by the
juxtaposition present in my introduction. In areas with a deep social/political divide
between certain factions, the mixing of said contentious factions is viewed less favorably
than in countries where there is a higher degree of diversity and integration of different
groups with one another. In the former systems, intermarriage, and thus the mixing of the
various identities, is seen as integration, a term that brings with it both negative
perceptions in that those integrating are losing a key part of their identity—this being to
some an inherently negative thing52—as well as ultraistic depictions of a lack of prejudice
between the social groups. Typically applied to immigrants assimilating into their new
country of residence, I prefer to use the term “integration” more loosely, extending it to
local groups interacting with one another to a degree in which a single national identity is
created rather than having multiple different identity groups locked into a series of
competition with and negation of the other. In Rodriguez-Garcia’s compilation of
existing scholarship, intermarriage has been deemed “the ‘litmus test’ of immigrants’ and
ethnic minorities’ assimilation into mainstream society53,” and that “the increase in
intermarriage across national, cultural, racial, and religious boundaries worldwide could
be seen as a sign of the diminishing barriers to social interaction across groups and as an
important step in the lessening of ethno-racial distinctions in forthcoming generations54”.
While it is emphasized in Rodriguez-Garcia’s piece that the universality of these claims
has yet to be established by the dominant literature, it at least has been documented in
some contexts. Therefore, when a state does not even make intermarriage an option, it
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restricts any potential upward mobility that might ensue by the disenfranchised class, thus
entrenching inequalities between the social groups.
Looking at the trends of intermarriage on identity amongst groups who are both
native nationals, there is consensus within academia that while it can lessen inequality
along racial/ethnic lines, it can also perpetuate inequality along other cleavages55.
Typically, exogamous unions along racial or ethnic lines are still endogamous in terms of
socioeconomic class or educational attainment. As traditionally disenfranchised social or
ethnic groups disproportionately comprise lower socioeconomic classes and levels of
education, “those among the disadvantaged ethnic group who [are left to] inmarry will be
less educated56,” in turn producing less educated offspring. Seeing as intermarriages
along racial/ethnic lines are inmarriages along those of class or level of education, there
is justification for the minorities within a system to support endogamy as a means of
cultural preservation. Looking at the children of interracial couples, black-white, Native
American-white, Asian-white, and Hispanic-white, all combinations of parents typically
denote their children’s races as mixed rather than prioritizing one parent’s race over the
other. Aside from this majority, in all parental pairings but black-white, more parents
identified their children as white as opposed to the minority race present in the family57.
For Hispanics—who are a multiracial ethnic group—and Native Americans, the two
racial groups with the fewest historical marital restrictions, “education is strongly linked
to identifying children as ‘white’58”, identifying the next generation with the most
privileged faction. Educational attainment may thus be able to serve as a bridge between
racial/ethnic groups within a heterogenous society, serving as a tool for social mobility.
The ideas explored in examining intermarriages along racial/ethnic lines can serve
as an indicator when the population is divided by religion, even if the Western concept of
race is not as politically relevant within that particular system. The former seat of the
Ottoman Empire, what is now Turkey, did away with the approach outlined by the millet
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system soon after the Empire’s collapse. At this time, the new republic was struggling to
modernize with its smallest amount of territory in centuries. Though family law was
secularized and interfaith marriages legally possible, the ethnoreligious approach to
Turkish nationality ensured that non-Muslim communities and their members retained
statuses of inferiority. As time went on, religion once again became political, largely as a
means to secure votes59. Non-Muslim Turks, out of an increasing feeling of isolation,
emigrated in droves, with ever dwindling numbers further cementing their “othered”
status. Remnants of minority communities turned insular in response to perceived threat
of erasure. Interfaith marriages thus became undesirable for all parties. For Muslim
Turks, marrying a non-Muslim would mean marrying someone of questionable loyalties,
as though they had full Turkish citizenship, non-Muslims were not socially considered to
be fully part of the Turkish nation, literally referred to as “foreigners”60. For the minority
partner, marrying into Muslim society would mean a demographic hit to already
diminished numbers. In 1962, Ulku Adatape, daughter of Mustafa Ataturk, stirred
national controversy over her marriage to a Jewish man. Though her husband was a
Turkish citizen, had served in the military, and had done nothing to warrant suspicion of
his loyalty, he was still portrayed as a foreigner, and their marriage equated to Ulku
turning her back on both her country and her father’s legacy. Their marriage, involving
not just any Turkish Muslim girl, but the daughter of such a beloved national leader,
directly questioned the politically popular notion that Turkey was an inherently Islamic
country, and that as such, in order to be Turkish, one had to be Muslim.
Whether based upon race or religion, there are commonalities in the systematic
usage of regulating who can marry whom. Since 1933, it has been “illegal for Egyptian
diplomatic and consular representatives (as well as administrators in the delegations and
consulates and students enrolled in the diplomatic and consular corps) to marry nonEgyptian women”, a precedent that permeated into the 2014 Constitution which stipulates
that presidential candidates may not be married to a foreigner, despite the fact that such a
provision’s existence in earlier versions of the document would have voided the
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candidacy of Egypt’s three longest-serving presidents61. Egypt too limits marriage along
religious lines due to its adherence to a millet-like system. Turning away from the millet
system for a moment, regimes of various systems of governance have taken it upon
themselves to determine which familial makeups are and are not acceptable. The policies
drawn along national lines included several European countries, such as the Netherlands,
in which women who married foreign men would lose their Dutch citizenship62. It should
also be noted that in certain cases, governments have encouraged intermarriage, also a
means of controlling future demographics. Following independence from Spain, Mexico
attracted many white foreign investors in sparsely populated areas of the country. To
ensure that these investors did not leave after they had profited off the land, thus costing
the economy everything it had hoped to gain from the initial investment, Mexico made
acquiring citizenship and trade opportunities available to investors who married local
women63.
The majority of pluralist democratic societies view ethnicity and ethnic
differences of its citizenry in one of two ways. By making it private, as is common in
liberal democracies where all citizens are treated equally, or by making it public, in that
groups are recognized and mechanisms such as power-sharing implemented as a guard
against ethnic conflict64. A few countries, however, have democratic systems, yet
strongly favor a single ethnic group. Only a handful of countries have ever embraced the
“ethnic democracy” model, yet those included in this short list are Estonia, Latvia, and
Israel65. Due to the bias of such structures, it is expected that maintenance of the
dominate group’s hegemony would be of social and political importance. While there
may be several ethnic factions within a country, the majority only sees two: themselves
and everyone else, who becomes a uniform “other” subjected to unequal treatment66.
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Seeing as the children of intermarried parents are less likely than children of
endogamous unions to identify with a single group, “intermarriage decreases the salience
of cultural distinctions in future generations67”, meaning it is something ethnic
democracies would not want to encourage. Yet Estonia and Latvia do not prohibit
interethnic marriages68. Even if there may be unequal treatment in those ethnic
democracies, individuals are still given choice over romantic partners because that is
what democratic principles tell them they must do. Meanwhile, Israel is home to legal
system that at its formation had already been provided with a historical alternative to civil
marriage, an alternative that satisfied their political goals while making it look as if they
respected local religious authorities. Through the continued application of the millet
system, interfaith marriage, which in this case intersects with interethnic marriage,
remains nearly impossible. For the most part, the ethnic groups remain distinct, allowing
for control over demographics and the propagation of identity based on exclusion.

67

Matthijs Kalmijn, Intermarriage and Homogramy: Causes, Patterns, Trends, 24 ANNUAL REVIEW OF
SOCIOLOGY 395 (1998). at 396.
68
Marriage.hiddush.org. n.d. Freedom of Marriage World Map. [online] Available at:
<https://marriage.hiddush.org/> [Accessed 26 August 2020].

28

III. Israeli Case Study

Though a lack of civil marriage is nearly universal throughout the Middle East, Israel is
the only democracy in the Western world to delegate marriage and divorce solely to the
major religious authorities69. Committed to the image of a Jewish state, ensuring that
Jews retain their majority status has long been a chief political concern, with rhetoric
frequently employed regarding high Arab birth rates, bringing with them a demographic
threat. While Jews are considered both members of an ethnic group as well as a religious
community, the current legal system as it pertains to personal status ensures that
difference is based primary on religious rather than ethnic lines. This further helps the
majority by erasing the subethnic lines that once divided the global diasporic Jewish
population, while simultaneously dividing the previously unified, religiously diverse,
Arab population. Continued utilization of remnants of the millet system, i.e., along
religious rather than ethnic lines, has been one way in which the state has ensured that the
social groups remain insular, seeing as all the major recognized religious communities in
the state prohibit interfaith marriage in some capacity. This unification/fragmentation
narrative is made even stronger in the state’s recognition of only one Jewish
denomination, the Orthodox, while Arab citizens can fall under the jurisdiction of either
(Sunni) Islamic, Druze, or one of eleven denominations of Christian religious authorities.
By unifying the Jews and dividing the Arabs, a system is created in which the
disenfranchised groups are too distracted by their internal divisions to focus on the
discrepancies between them and their common oppressor.
To be completely transparent, this legal discrepancy could be more simply
explained. Looking through a primordialist lens, one could conclude that the different
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approaches for different communities resulted because identity is inherent. Treating
everyone as if they had the same needs can still result in inequalities. There is some merit
to this outlook, especially considering that the most devout individuals from these
religious communities are often those most supportive of the continuation of Israel’s
millet-based system70. However, it is also quite passive, granting agency to no one and
nothing. It negates the fact that humans orchestrate our own political systems, as well as
that these political systems, and the societies that create them, evolve over time. Even if
religious communities may wish to attribute their ways to divinity, this answer cannot
account for systems in which ethnicity is the primary source of division. Israeli family
law may be governed by religious institutions, but as this chapter will highlight, religion
is not the primary social cleavage. Ethnicity is, yet those in power maintain ethnic
hegemony through religious channels.
This paper would be incomplete if it did not, at least briefly, discuss Israel’s
colonial past. Looking at the state’s history, we see that Zionism, the very ideology that
led to the state’s foundation, is European. Early Zionist leadership was not Israeli; they
were European. Once Britain relinquished control of the territory, Jewish leadership had
no one left to answer to, allowing them to implement whatever colonial-inspired policies
they saw fit. Often referred to as a settler-colonial state71, such a label requires “the prior
extermination or expulsion of a majority of the indigenous populations, followed by the
demographic ‘swamping’ of these territories by settlers72”. I will not explore question as
to whether or not Israel is guilty of settler colonialism, instead, the preceding quote has
been used to underscore the importance of demographics when the end goal is
domination over a portion of land, its resources, and its people.
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A. Demographics
Due to the nature of Judaism as an ethnoreligion as well as Israel’s long-held status as a
conflict state, the cleavages of ethnicity and religion are simultaneously cross-cutting and
coinciding. The country’s ethnic makeup is relatively straightforward with roughly three
quarters being Jewish and the remainder being Arab. Religiously speaking, Israel is home
to four main religious groups: Jews account for roughly 74.7% of the population,
Muslims for 17.7%, Christians for 2%, and Druze for 1.6%73. The remaining 4% of the
population are “nonaffiliated”, meaning that they do not have a religious system of courts
to answer to, and until very recently, they essentially could not be married within the
state of Israel. While some in this category belong to small religious sects outside the
Jewish/Muslim/Christian/Druze classification, the vast majority of those with this nonstatus are Jews according to Israeli citizenship laws, but not under Judaic religious law.
Within the roughly 75% of the population that is formally recognized as Jewish,
both ethnic and religious divides are present that further divide Israeli society in different
ways. Though the Ashkenazim, Jews with European roots, founded the Zionist movement
and comprised most of early Israeli leadership, the majority of Israeli Jews are Mizrachi74
who have ethnic ties to the Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and North
Africa. Seeing as Orthodox Judaism is the only recognized denomination within the state,
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intra-Jewish religious divides are more based upon religiosity rather than denomination.
One is considered either secular (hiloni), traditional (masorti), Orthodox (dati), or ultraOrthodox (haredi)75 with secularists currently comprising the largest faction of Jewish
society, followed by traditional, then Orthodox, and finally haredim as the smallest
segment76. This, however, is likely to change in coming years. With an annual
population growth rate of 6 – 7%, far exceeding that of any other segment of the
country’s population77, the ultra-Orthodox is an ever-increasing demographic that is
becoming all the more politically relevant.
Despite the country’s secular image, elements of personal status law—exact
elements varying from faith to faith—still fall under the jurisdiction of the various
religious institutions78. Islam is recognized as the second most prevalent religion in the
country, with the Druze being a small, protected minority that while enjoying a
differentiated status, are often considered Muslim for statistical purposes79. Several
denominations of Christianity are recognized in Israel in accordance with the Ottoman
millet system: Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Gregorian-Armenian, Armenian
Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Chaldean, Greek Catholic Melkite, Maronite, Syrian Orthodox,
and Evangelical Episcopal80. The Anglican Church as well as the B’hai faith are also
recognized as per Mandate-era laws81. Like the Rabbinate, the authority for each
Christian denomination, as well as the Shari’a and Druze Courts, oversee the marriages
of their respective adherents. Naturally, the exact requirements for marriage vary between
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the religious authorities, however, the Rabbinate, Shari’a Courts, Druze Courts, as well as
the courts of most Christian denominations all have at least some restrictions on interfaith
marriage, ensuring that demographics remain relatively straightforward and predictable.
A Jewish state is utilizing a Turkish system, even when it runs directly counter to
the democratic principles said state swears to uphold. Surely, the rationale for such policy
implementation must be deeper than it was easier to maintain the status quo. While there
may have always been Jews in Palestine, they accounted for a small minority, and until
the 1880s also local, population, for which there were no major tensions with the Arab
majority82. The conflict only became ethnic when demographics began to shift. Britain
allowed Jewish immigration in droves, far exceeding the quotas seen during Ottoman
Rule, propelling Jews from 8% of the Palestinian population in 1918 to 31% in 194283.
The indigenous Arab population was then depleted after 700,000 civilians were forced
from their homes as a result of the 1948 War84. In attempts to saturate the country’s
demographic makeup even further, the new Jewish elite encouraged immigration of their
ethnoreligious kin en masse, making citizenship all but guaranteed if someone could
prove Jewish descent85. Such outreach measures to diasporic communities continues to
this day, still for the sake of trying to amass the largest Jewish population possible.
This has been one of the main objectives of the Israeli government throughout its
modern history: to ensure that a Jewish majority is established and maintained. Shortly
after formal statehood, Jews comprised almost 90% of the Israeli population, soaring
from 8% to 90% in a little over three decades. However, hegemony is still not considered
secure, as that percentage has been steadily decreasing since the annexation of Jerusalem
in 196786. The demographic threat has thus been a highly contentious political issue since
before statehood as changes in the amount of governed territory has had a substantial
impact on the ethnic makeup of the country. For decades too, Arab birth rates far
outpaced those of Jewish Israelis. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, such
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trend changed only in 2018, yet with 3.04 and 3.05 births per woman respectively87,
demographics remain a key area of focus for Jewish leadership88.
Due to the demographic threat that has long had to be contended with, the
government has had to rely on the immigration—or “return” as they see it—of diasporic
Jewish communities lest the Arabs assume a majority. The definition of who is
considered a Jew is also a complicated question with a seemingly ever-changing answer.
The Mizrachim were only considered to be a vital demographic source after much of the
Ashkenazi population was exterminated. Specifics surrounding their historical status will
be explained later. Immediately after the War of 1948 saw formal Israeli statehood,
Jewish residents of Islamic countries were forced out quickly, meaning that the state
could only rely on them for a short-term influx of emigration rather than a long-term
demographic source. Once demographic reserves from the Middle East and North Africa
were depleted, Jews from the Former Soviet Union served as the next wave of
immigration to Israel. This created a new issue in Israeli demography and negotiation of
personal status law as it caused a huge influx in the country’s non-affiliated population.
An ethnoreligion, people can technically convert to Judaism, but the process is
notoriously difficult, not encouraged by the state, and not common, likely due in part to
the deep ethnic divisions present within Israeli society. The annual number of
conversions to Judaism between 1998 and 2014 were roughly equal to the annual number
of non-affiliated individuals born89, making conversion unreliable in maintaining
majority status.

B. Legal Approach to Marriage

The delegation of marriage to the individual religious organs may look like a compromise
on two different fronts: one regarding intra-Jewish debates over religiosity of the state
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and the other pertaining to the treatment of minorities. Looking at the first compromise,
religious jurisdiction over set elements of personal status provided a line between the
religious and the secular. The prominence of religious tenets in civil law is highly
contested in any society in which a politically relevant portion of the population is deeply
religious, with the debates likely being even louder when said religion is an ethnoreligion
in the context of a conflict zone. This is even further complicated due to the state’s
commitment of being both “Jewish” and “democratic”, an interesting paradox
considering the former is a religion and the latter implying adherence to liberal—read
secular—principles. Such a negotiation of the two is quite difficult, and as highlighted
throughout this piece, seemingly never successful in appeasing all factions of society, or
even, all factions of Jewish society. As legitimacy in this context relies upon an
ethnoreligious claim, policies that draw distinctions between Jewish as an ethnic group
and Judaism as a religion must be very careful in alienating just the right amount of
people in the right way to ensure continued public support.
Upon the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and British takeover of Palestine, the
Mandate Period upheld the millet system as essentially a consolation prize for Muslim
Palestinians. Having been the official courts during Turkish rule, once the British took
control of the region, Muslims, long the majority, for the first time found themselves just
another community to which control was delegated. They went from the hegemon to a
subordinate class quite rapidly. A Christian state promising land to Jewish leadership,
Britain was well aware of this sharp decline in the status of Muslims in the area and their
courts, and as such formalized the Islamic religious authority90 despite supporting the
implementation of a Jewish government. This was the foundation for the Christian, and
eventually Druze, courts to be both fragmented and official—at least in practicality—
organs of the state, thus solidifying the neo-millet approach into post- (or neo-) colonial
history. Immediately prior to statehood when British influence was waning, David BenGurion conceded some elements of the state to Orthodox religious authorities in a letter
that became known as the status quo agreement. Included within religious jurisdiction
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was the continued oversight of marriage and divorce for Jewish citizens91. Just like the
Ottomans, Israel too implemented the millet system in the territory they ruled out of
perceived necessity, with the precise need being very similar despite being enacted by
different majority religions. Whereas the Ottomans had to contend with plurality over
vast territory, Israel had to win allegiance to a small geographic space but by a people
spread throughout the globe.
The ever-increasing demographic and political relevance of the ultra-Orthodox
population comes with increased demands for adherence to religious law. At the time the
millet system became codified into modern Israeli law, however, the Orthodox were not
by themselves politically significant enough to play such a role in deciding state
policies92. In order for the courts to gain original jurisdiction, secular leadership could not
have been too opposed to religion playing a role in the civil state. Reflecting back to the
idea of neo-primordialism, we see early post-1948 leadership utilizing both ethnicity and
religion to further a nationalistic project as a means of satisfying two ideological
objectives of the new state. According to Sezgin, both the homogenization of formerly
diasporic populations as well as the creation of division within the political “other” could
be accomplished through the institutionalization of religion93. Seeing as the immigrant
communities to the new state came from different countries of origin, spoke different
languages, and often had different religious practices, by unifying them all under one
branch of Judaism, the state provided a strong commonality that had previously been
weak, helping to solidify the “us versus them”. While certainly social perceptions of
these intra-Jewish divisions remained, no longer was there a formal Mizrachi versus
Ashkenazi or secular versus Orthodox divide. Instead, all Jews were considered simply
“Jewish”, so long as they were considered so under halacha, Orthodox religious law.
With this unification of the group which the state was most concerned with
overseeing too came the dividing of populations who did not fall under this pan-Jewish
umbrella. The Jews and the Arabs of what would become modern Israel comprised
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inverse cleavages. While the former shared a common religion (even if exact beliefs
varied) and multiple ethnic identities, the latter was a single ethnic and national, but
multi-religious group. In having identity for members of the new state revolve around
religious lines, unification of the majority and continuation of said majority was achieved
through the very process that divided the minority. Arabic speaking, the Druze are more
friendly with the Jewish establishment than other minorities, often even choosing to serve
in the Israeli Defense Forces despite being exempt from the country’s mandatory military
conscription94. As such, the granting of their religious authorities formal jurisdiction,
which had not been done under either British or Ottoman rule, was a means of making
the social hierarchy more explicit in the removal of the most well integrated faction of
Arab society from the default Arab, presumed Muslim, population pool. The favoring of
a very small percentage of “othered” members of Israeli society thus served to push the
Muslim population even lower in the social hierarchy. Unlike the other three religions,
Christian courts, while maintaining similar jurisdiction over matters of personal status,
are the only religious legal institutions to have never been overseen by the Ministry of
Justice or Ministry of Religious Affairs95. The formalization of all the various sects was
unnecessary, seeing as the relatively small Christian population is already divided
between denominations. Continuation of a millet-based system ensured that this social
division was self-perpetuating. Just as it is prohibited for Jews to marry non-Jews,
respective religious authorities for Christians and Druze too have laws against exogamy.
While Muslim men can technically marry Christian and Jewish women, this practice is
socially discouraged, and the insular nature of those other religious groups makes cases
of such rare, thereby preventing any unity between the various Arab religious factions
that could possibly threaten the state.
According to Karayanni, granting authority over personal status law to what
would become minority religious groups was also a means of legitimizing the formation
of the new state in the eyes of the international community96. Given the multi-religious
makeup of Israel, Balfour and the subsequent policies of the Mandate period and early
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statehood were very careful in maximizing promises of religious tolerance. This brings us
to another negotiation that the state has had had to navigate: liberalism in a system that is
inherently coercive. A private matter, individual religious beliefs/practices suddenly
become public concern when laws are different for members of different faiths. Explicitly
favoring “the establishment in Palestine a home for the Jewish people”, the 1917 Balfour
Declaration also stated, “that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities”. Similarly, the 1922 Mandate
for Palestine pledged to uphold respect for “the personal status of the various peoples and
communities” in the region, with the 1948 Declaration of Independence echoing the same
rhetoric97. The language, in a way both representative of a millet-like system and a means
of securing it continuation, does not, notably, refer to the rights of individuals from nonJewish communities, rather to the rights of the communities as singular entities. While
Jews are too coerced into abiding by a communitarian approach to personal status law,
the Rabbinical Court only has jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, whereas Christian
and Muslim courts enjoy a more expansive jurisdiction, including over elements of
personal status such as custody agreements98 and inheritance99. Whereas an individual
Jew can choose not to marry—more on the trend to forego marriage entirely later on—
and hence remove him or herself from the scope of the Rabbinical Authority, a Muslim
cannot choose, for example, not to have a family member die and thus avoid being
subjected to the jurisdiction of the Shari’a courts. Rights, according to the current Israeli
structure, are thus group rights, with little space reserved for those who do not wish to
adhere to the religious law prescribed to them. As such, nonbelievers, want-to-beconverts, and general secularists are forced into abiding by theocratic principles instead
of the democratic ones the state claims to be interested in upholding.
The jurisdiction of the Rabbinate increased following formal statehood, but has
been slowly chipped away at by the civil courts to varying degrees of success. Contrary
to the pure millet system, reforms made during the Mandate Period required that Jewish
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individuals register with the religious authorities in order to have access to the Rabbinical
Courts. Therefore, if someone did not want their lives overseen by the Rabbinate, they
could choose simply not to register themselves and therefore be subjected only to civil
law100. While the Rabbinical authority did have a say over a wider variety of issues that
fell under the personal status umbrella, at least Jews had a choice as to which law,
religious or civil, they followed. This choice was taken away with the passage of the
Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law of 1953, which while limiting the jurisdiction of the
Rabbinical courts solely to matters of marriage and divorce rather than to all elements of
personal status law also made such jurisdiction mandatory. Soon after in 1955, the
Dayanim Law was adopted which made Rabbinical judges (called danayim) state
officials equal in position to that of civil judges101. Civil legislation was enacted granting
official authority to a body other than the state, in a way subcontracting out the state’s
jurisdiction while placing the subcontracted party on a level equal to that of the
contracting state itself. Whereas religion is private to the individual, and whereas Israel
has supposedly promised to recognize the freedom of religion, seeing as everyone must
be under some religious authority, the state does not recognize the right of someone to
not be religious at all. In having no alternative for recognized family formation, the state
successfully places religion in the public realm without blatantly prioritizing one religion
over another.
Since the 1953 reforms, little has changed regarding the structure of marriage
within Israel, at least for the country’s Jewish majority. Over time, with Jewish migration
came, much to Israeli leadership’s dismay, non-Jewish migration as well, which further
complicated the country’s fragile demographic makeup. Most of the non-affiliated are
ethnically Jewish per Israel’s Law of Return which recognizes anyone as “Jewish
enough” for citizenship provided he or she has at least one Jewish grandparent or has
converted to Judaism. A discrepancy is created in that once citizenship is obtained, the
individual must qualify as Jewish under Orthodox law in order to be religiously
considered a Jew, with halacha requiring an individual have a Jewish mother in order to
be recognized as a member of the faith without the need to undergo an Orthodox
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conversion. In certain diasporic communities, such as those in the former Soviet Union,
marriages between Jews and non-Jews was/is fairly common, and upon the wave of
Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel in the 1990s, hundreds of thousands found themselves
outsiders in the very state that was supposed to finally provide them with a sense of
community. This “othering” happened to those who did meet the requirements to be
considered a member of the Jewish faith but who came from countries/regions in which
records sufficient to prove descent simply were not kept, a large number of non-Jews
who immigrated with their Jewish family members102, as well thousands of patrilineal
Jews who were not “Jewish enough” for the Rabbinate. Considering that different
societies have different perceptions of ethnicity and race, many of these individuals not
only considered themselves Jewish, but were also considered Jewish by those around
them in their country of origin, thus creating a split identity upon their arrival to Israel.
As the rules of halacha are what governs marriage, these ethnic Jews are unable to marry
anyone who is Jewish according to the religious definition, i.e., the majority of the
population, regardless of the partners’ individual degree of religiosity. This Jew-“ish”
status is then passed on to future generations, as its status, like that of Judaism, passes
through the maternal line.
In response to the gap created by this demographic shift, Israel adopted the Civil
Union Law for Citizens with No Religious Affiliation in 2010, which gives couples the
option to enter into a civilly governed partnership provided both members are considered
non-affiliated. Despite the titular phrase being “civil union”, a phrase used in the West
typically to refer to recognized unions similar to but with fewer benefits than for samesex couples, the definition of “couple” as per Section 1 of the 2010 law ensures that only
heterosexual, non-affiliated couples are eligible for civil marriage. Couples in which one
partner meets the criteria to belong to a recognized religious group are still ineligible for
any formalization of their relationship. This too is in line with the state’s policy following
the 2006 Noahides case, which after decades of silence regarding the validity of civil
marriages performed abroad decided to recognize these unions provided that the couple
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was eligible to marry in Israel103. Though the Noahides decision contained the caveat that
the couple must able to marry in Israel for their marriage to be recognized, it nonetheless
set the foundation for quick legal reforms, perhaps as an attempt by the civil courts to
take back the power long delegated to the religious authorities. Within that same year, the
Israeli Population Registry was counting members of these otherwise illegitimate unions
as formally married104. This consideration has created the legal precedent of formal
recognition for all couples married overseas, whether they be legally eligible to marry in
Israel or not. Due both to the high proportion of the non-affiliated, as well as a vocal
opposition to the coercive nature of the Rabbinate, in 2010, roughly 16% of Israeli
couples wed in civil ceremonies abroad, with that number appearing to only be on the
rise105, even amongst couples who could marry legally within the state.
In recent decades, the civil courts have been trying to reformat a hierarchy of
legal authority in which civil law supersedes religious law. This has been seen both with
regard to the Rabbinical and Shari’a Courts. For everyday court proceedings, there is a
hierarchy through which the religious courts must respond. After being heard by the
lower religious court, each religion has a court of appeals. After the appellate decision,
parties can petition review by the Israeli Supreme Court, even in cases that would
normally fall under religious jurisdiction. While the Supreme Court is often careful in
their decisions to maintain the delicate balance between the state and the religious
establishments, the civil system can still have a say in matters otherwise delegated under
the personal status umbrella. For example, the state has criminalized both polygamy and
marriage to a girl below a certain age since prior to formal statehood, even though it
conflicts with the beliefs of several religions who hold jurisdiction over marriage. While
the secular state has the power to punish the act of polygamy as criminal law falls outside
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the scope of the religious courts, it does not have the power to render polygamous
marriages void, since determining the validity of a marriage would be an infringement
upon religious jurisdiction. Interestingly, however, either because of Judaic hegemony or
the impending “demographic threat”, an already married Jewish man can obtain special
permission from the Rabbinate to take another wife without fear of conviction106,
whereas a married Muslim man does not have the option to obtain special permission
from the Shari’a Courts107, despite polygamy being perfectly legal under Islamic law.
Seeing as the courts cannot extend civil marriage to all couples—such a policy
could only be enacted by the legislature who is constrained by the need to cater to
religious parties—they instead have begun taking an alternative route in the extending of
rights previously associated with marriage to non-married couples. Lacking a
constitution, Israel’s supreme law lies in a collection of pieces of legislation known as
Basic Laws, which can be adopted by the Knesset whenever it deems necessary. One
such example of these laws was the 1992 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,
wherein Article 7(a) states “all persons have the right to privacy and to intimacy108”.
Notice that this article gives no explicit reference to marriage, which is exactly why it is
notable. If the legislature wished solely to confine its constituents to the religious system,
the language provided would have been contingent upon the religious legitimizing of
intimacy, i.e. marriage. The fact that more secular language was employed was a means
of granting at least some recognition to informal unions, at least in the eyes of the courts.
While the courts have occasionally used this article to refer specifically to formal
marriage, such is rare, with most pertinent judicial opinions viewing it as a means to
extend the legal rights and duties of marriage to non-married, cohabitating couples109.
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Noting their constraint, in recent decades, the non-religious courts have focused
more upon the idea of reputed spouse, or yedu’im be-tzibur. Since 1965, Israel has
recognized the right of reputed spouses to inherit just as a spouse would through the
adoption of Section 55 of the Law of Succession. In 2006, immediately following the
Noahides decision, this right to inherit was expanded through the Inheritance Case, for
the first time not focusing on the common-law aspect of the couple’s informal union, but
in recognizing the surviving party’s right to inherit as a “married” person110. The couple
in question was interestingly an interfaith one, with the surviving “wife” having been a
Christian cohabitating with a Jewish man. Furthermore, after decades of battling in the
legal arena regarding the ability for non-married couples to bare the same last name, the
Names Law was finally amended in 1992 after the Supreme Court ruled that “their
relationship as unmarried cohabitants cannot serve as a basis for denying them the right
to change their name”111. At the same time, however, reputed spouses still do not enjoy
privileges pertaining to trial proceedings, avoidance of military conscription, or the very
real but hard to quantify symbolic standing that comes with a formal marriage112.
This attempt by the Civil Courts to diminish religious oversight pertaining to
formal relationships, however, has not come without response from the Rabbinate. In
addition to the 2006—clearly a busy year for legal questions pertaining to marriage—
ruling that civil marriages conducted abroad were valid, the Supreme Court also ruled
that “the rabbinical court system had jurisdiction over the divorce of couples who had
married in civil ceremonies….however, that such a divorce should be performed in a
shorter procedure than a religious divorce113,” considering that a religious divorce is
notoriously difficult to obtain as well as heavily biased against women. However, this
decision has largely been ignored and full religious divorce procedures have often been
carried out even for couples who did not marry under Rabbinical Law114. In many of the
cases in which Rabbinical Courts have followed the 2006 decision, they have also tried to
expand their jurisdiction over the dissolution of the marriage into areas over which they
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have not held authority since prior to the reforms of the 1950s, such as alimony payments
and division of property115. Reacting to the apparent caveat that the legislature and civil
courts have created in the recognition of yedu’im be-tzibur, the Rabbinical Courts have
too tried to force Jewish law upon the dissolution of reputed spousal relations, meaning a
divorce for people who have never been officially married116. In short, the Rabbinate has
refused to recognize the decision of the civil court, essentially rendering futile the latter
court’s attempt to seize back power.
But say the Rabbinical authorities simply chose not to interfere in couples who
have not gone through the religious marriage proceedings. Blecher-Prigat believes this to
be a feasible solution117, as, if the rights were same, couples unable to marry would still
have a channel of relationship recognition. Marriage in all but name. Does this sound
familiar? Civil unions and the like were inferior structures designed to serve the political
need of placation. Noting that the ways in which marriage have historically been utilized
by governments as a means of controlling populations, it may seem odd at how open the
institution has become. Once birth rates declined and civil rights became more relevant in
more traditionally liberal democracies, controlling the future demographics of the
population became less blatant of a concern to lawmakers. At current, it appears to be
regulating itself according to acceptable standards, meaning that additional government
regulation is not necessary in achieving ultimate objectives. The same is not true in Israel,
where Jewish leadership sees equal birth rates for Jews and Arabs as a threat to the
Jewish collective, even if these rates are still sufficient for Jews to maintain majority
status. This is likely the reason that common-law unions have yet to be recognized for
interfaith couples118. Reputed spouses and recognition of marriages abroad, even for nonheterosexual couples119, may indicate that the institution of marriage is slowly becoming
less restricted to Israelis, but that does not mean that the state no longer feels the need to
keep the ethnic/religious factions separate from one another.
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An ethnic democracy holding onto the millet system is a prime example of family
law exceptionalism, as it is through the national approach to family law that the ruling
ethnic group maintains its hegemony. Ethnic democracies are inherently neoprimordialist, as their policies, which run directly counter to the principles the state
claims to uphold, are made in response to a perceived democratic threat. It is no wonder
then that Israel served as the basis for Smooha’s ethnic democratic model, whose features
include:
“an ideology or a movement of ethnic nationalism that declares a certain
population as an ethnic nation sharing a common descent (blood ties), a common
language and a common culture. This ethnic nation claims ownership of a certain
territory that it considers its exclusive homeland….the ethnic nation, not the
citizenry, shapes the symbols, laws and policies of the state for the benefit of the
majority. This ideology makes a crucial distinction between members and nonmembers of the ethnic nation. Members of the ethnic nation may be divided into
persons living in the homeland and persons living in the diaspora….Citizenship is
separate from nationality….[sic new paragraph] Non-members of the ethnic
nation are not only regarded as less desirable but are also perceived as a serious
threat to the survival and integrity of the ethnic nation120.”
Proponents of the state of Israel see it as a Jewish homeland. In order for a specific group
of people to have a homeland, specifically in which diasporic populations are actively
encouraged to move to that homeland121, there must be something believed to be intrinsic
about that group of people entitling them to that land, at least in their own collective
conscious. Other authors writing on Israel’s divided social structure and the demographic
threat tend to lean more towards the instrumentalism camp of theories of social
identity122. While this is accurate, I feel it is not entirely comprehensive as such a stance
takes the homeland narrative for granted. For Zionist Jews, Israel is not just a place for
Jews to live, it is an essential part of the Jewish identity itself, a part of the identity that is
perceived to be under attack, constantly threatened, to such a substantial degree that the
entire collective is at risk. Accounting for this self-perception in the collective conscious
is necessary to understand just how truly instrumental the country’s policies are in
maintaining segregation, and thus protecting the Jewish collective from the Arab threat.
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But a key part of being an ethnic democracy is too, aside from the disparity
between social groups, having democratic institutions. This is where family law
exceptionalism comes into play. Israel is democratic enough to be considered an ethnic
democracy. Democratic institutions are present, with regular free and fair parliamentary
elections, a judiciary to check the power of parliament, and journalist freedoms123. Arab
citizens of Israel enjoy full democratic rights equal to those of Jewish citizens124.
However, the groups cannot intermarry as a result of the country’s millet-like approach to
personal status law. Through family law, the law regulating marriage, segregation, a nondemocratic principle, is enforced. Social stigma that both results from and is compounded
by this forced segregation in turn creates more segregation, only to ultimately create more
social stigma. Family law is the exception to Israel’s democracy. Whether that is the
result of historical happenstance—the empire which invented the millet system just
happened to take over a very historically relevant piece of land—is beyond the point.
Delegating marriage to the jurisdiction of the religious authorities was not a decision
made out of convenience, but a means of crafting the Jewish state Zionist leaders set out
to establish.

C. Old Intermarriage: The Redefining of Ethnic Ties
The fragmentation of Israel’s newfound “others” was not enough in consolidating a
single Jewish identity. With the unification of religion came an even more intense focus
on, and on eroding, subethnic divisions within the Jewish immigrant population to the
new state. Seeing as Judaism has long mandated religious insularity, and that on a
religious level, the country of origin is not pertinent when deciding an individual’s
Jewishness, the granting of authority to an Orthodox Rabbinate was also a means of
unifying Jewish citizens across ethnic lines. Given historical racial tensions between
Jewish populations from different parts of the world, “intermarriage” within the Israeli
context has predominantly been used to refer to couples in which one partner was
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Ashkenazi, of European origins, or Mizrachi, literally meaning “Eastern” but typically
connotating non-white Jewry, particularly from the Islamic World. This remains the
dominant definition in literature as late as 2020, despite known cases of Jewish-Arab
marriage, a fact that in itself says a great deal about the way in which these relationships
are viewed within Israeli society. The issues surrounding and evolution of interethnic
mixed-Jewish marriage is thus a necessary foundation to explore interfaith Jewish/nonJewish unions.
The early Zionist movement was dominated by the Ashkenazi, who had little
regard—or even downright contempt—for non-European Jewry. This was the result of
blatant racism125, yes, but the demonization of other social groups is usually done with an
objective. When Zionism was in its fledgling stages, Britain controlled Palestine, and as
such, the leadership had to garner support of an even more blatant colonial power.
Cloaking themselves as fellow colonizers126, those who wished to “civilize” a “barbaric”
region, was likely a political strategy, just like their current guise of being a persecuted
people in need of protection. As Jews from Europe began to settle in Palestine, discussion
on the integration of Eastern diasporic populations did not first occur until 1907. When
talks finally began, they were within the context of establishing a labor force in Israel that
did not require reliance on Arab populations, a policy that ultimately stirred up further
contempt for non-Ashkenazi Jews127. With the Holocaust and the extermination of half of
the Ashkenazi population, however, attitudes began to change as it became clear that
Europe would prove an insufficient source for the new Israeli population128. Immediately
following recognition of statehood, efforts to recruit Jewish immigrants from multiple
diasporic communities were well under way, but those from Eastern communities, though
now needed by the state, were still treated as second class. Mizrachi immigrants were
forced into “transit camps”, little more than makeshift, refugee-style housing, upon their
arrival to Israel. Once the camps had reached capacity, Mizrachi, primarily North African
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immigrants of the 1950s, were sent to live in desert villages immediately upon their
arrival to the country, as the state could not drum up enough volunteers from other
populations for their quest to cultivate rural land129. Ashkenazim new to the country,
however, were “given homes of the displaced Palestinian population”130 typically in areas
of the country that were in the highest demand amongst newcomers.
As the Mizrachim filled the role of the social “others” and comprised a lower rung
of the social ladder within Israeli society, marriages between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi
Jews, though religiously permitted, were highly frowned upon by many of the new state’s
citizenry131. This changed rapidly following formal statehood, with “mixed” marriages of
this nature doubling from 10% of all Jewish marriages in 1950 to 20% in 1980132.
Leadership now saw internal division this as a national threat, and thus took measures to
erode the social rifts that existed between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi Israelis. Legitimized
and facing a much graver demographic threat than intra-Jewish mixing, leaders such as
David Ben Gurion and Menachem Begin, despite being political opponents, both
encouraged the abandonment of subethnic ties as a means of creating a single unified
Jewish identity. This so-called melting pot policy for Israel’s Jewish citizens had three
facets: a uniform, national education system, mandatory military service, and
intermarriage133.
Though intended to be unifying policies, the mission to establish a single, panJewish “Sabra”134 identity was too built upon politics of exclusion, serving merely to
broaden the categories of “us versus them” rather than erode such notions. Upon the
formal recognition of a Jewish state came the need to uphold the collective identity as
such, meaning that demographics became an area of much contention. Like identity
formation in late Medieval Europe, establishing a single Jewish culture was necessary to
solidify legitimacy of the state, especially in Israel’s case given the controversial nature
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of its statehood within both its own territory and the international sphere. Unification, the
merging of communities from different corners of the world, who practiced their religion
differently and spoke different native languages, needed to be based against someone
else. Someone had to assume the role of the “other” which was slowly being removed
from the Mizrachim. Naturally, this role was filled by Israel’s non-Jewish citizens,
particularly the Arab Muslims who as the only sizable minority also made up the primary
political threat. Sagiv and Yair highlight three key channels through which the state
sought to unify Jews of different ethnic backgrounds:
Education – Despite Eastern Jews being part of the melting pot policy,
stereotypes and sentiments of Mizrachi inferiority permeated into the Israeli
educational system. The state’s tipuach programs of the 1970s implemented in
public schools throughout the country have been described as “rehabilitation
program[s] for the ‘culturally challenged/mentally impaired”135. Using the
father’s country of origin as a factor in determining a student’s level of “need”,
these cultural reeducation programs overwhelming targeted the children of the
“uneducated”, “primitive” Mizrachi immigrants. Essentially methods of
reeducation, these programs were to ensure that Mizrachi children, whose families
often came from the Middle East or North Africa, spoke Arabic as a native
language, and may have been fairly well-integrated into Arab society, better
aligned with the “more Jewish” Ashkenazi-inspired culture.
Military Service – The idea of military service as a means of enforcing national
identity is not shocking, giving the price servicemembers must often pay for what
is seen as the collective good. However, the crafting of identity via the Israeli
Defense Force is unique in that it was deliberately intended to serve as part of the
state’s attempt at Jewish unification. In the formation of a single national identity,
military service was also another channel for cultural integration/reeducation,
with Mizrachi Jews “expected to undergo a process of ‘desocialization’ whereby
they were to shed their cultural customs”, replacing them with an Ashkenazi
system of values136. While ethnic divisions and stereotyping still exists between
Ashkenazi and Mizrachi members of the military137, mandatory military
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conscription has helped to warp perception of the enemy enough to make the
overall policy of pan-Jewish integration a success.
Intermarriage—Once socially frowned upon due to the perceived inferiority of
the Mizrachim, “mixed” intra-Jewish marriages are now relatively normalized in
Israel society, likely due in part to the state’s efforts in encouraging this merge in
identity. Whereas intermarriage may eventually contribute to an even sharper
disparity between what is left of the old ethnic factions, at the individual level,
there is a trend of upward mobility. The children of Ashkenazi-Mizrachi
marriages have always been situated in between the two in terms of educational
and economic level, and over time, these levels are steadily moving closer
towards the affluency enjoyed by the Ashkenazim138.
Facing disproportionate rates of poverty139 and the victims of racial stereotypes,
despite the efforts made by the state during the mid-20th century, disparities still exist
between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi Jews in Israel. With this in mind, however, their
situation began to improve only after another social class became even lower on the
social ladder than them. State efforts to create a melting pot policy appear largely to have
succeeded. In 1995, only 5.3% of those between the ages of 40 – 43 were multiethnic, but
with this figure increases substantially when examining younger and younger age groups,
reaching a quarter of the population (25.1%) of those between ages of 10 – 11 in that
same year140. As this generation is now of age to have their own children, the current rate
of multiethnic identification amongst Israeli Jews is likely even higher. Similar to the
perceptions that are still prominent in their country, the children of these AshkenaziMizrachi relationships still adhere to ethnic biases and racist sentiments141, yet
simultaneously see themselves as “the ultimate Israelis” proving that “societies can erase
racism and obliterate ethnic hatreds”142. This seemingly paradoxical relationship with
identity—or identities, depending on how one looks at it—makes sense as they are in a
transitional phase of societal ethnic dynamics. The respondents to Sagiv and Yair’s study
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who harbor such mixed feelings are the third generation of “Sabra” Israelis. Considering
that it takes four generations of mixedness for original ethnic values to be erased143, only
time will tell exactly how this growing segment of Israel’s population negotiates the
multiple sides to their ethnic identity.
An earlier piece by Sagiv using seemingly the same pool of interviewees
repeatedly highlights how the children of mixed unions rely on personal experiences to
disprove stereotypes of the two ethnicities144. Given the fact that more affluent and/or
educated individuals are more likely to intermarry, thus potentially skewing the
children’s perception of the reality faced by the two ethnic groups, these personal
experiences cannot be used as concrete evidence that ethnic tensions are lessening.
However, the subconscious need for individuals of dual ethnicity to counter stereotypes,
while it does highlight an internalization of them, is also a necessary step to their erosion.
So too is the fact that most of those surveyed initially refuse to “choose a side”, only to
later admit that they identify as “more of” one ethnicity or the other in order to fit into the
dominant social framework focused on categorization145. The erasing of such deeply
entrenched divisions does not happen overnight. Just as the ethnicities are slowly
beginning to mix, so too will the perceptions of them. The children of mixed unions are
still the products of their greater society, who do still rely on the Mizrachi-Ashkenazi
binary, and in order to fit into this social structure, they must have a means of translating
their individual identities into a language those around them can understand, even if that
translation is indirect. Constantly put in defense of their identity, this ever-growing
segment of the population, while sometimes having to resort to inaccurate language, is
creating a new word in the language that is Israeli culture. Just like the evolution of
language, it will take some time before such a term becomes official, entered into the
dictionary of culture. In the time being, some people may not understand its definition,
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and even more may not be able to use it naturally in conversation, but over time, the
meaning will become more widely understood.

D. New Intermarriage: The Threat of Further Redefinition

With all the controversy surrounding intra-Jewish marriage, the concept of a Jew
marrying a non-Jew, though widely practiced in some diasporic communities, remains
even more socially unacceptable as well as legally inaccessible within the Israeli context.
Out of all couples in Israel, only 5.2% were comprised of individuals from different
religious backgrounds146. This is a relatively large figure given my emphasis on the taboo
nature surrounding mixed relationships because, of this percentage, the vast majority
(84.4%) of interfaith couples (or 4.67% of total couples) were between a Jew and an
“other”, the latter category being primarily comprised on non-affiliated ethnic Jews who
simply not qualify as Jewish under halacha. Due to the fact that they are considered
Jewish at least by the civil organs of the state, it is likely that toleration of someone fully
recognized as Jewish marrying someone of non-affiliated status is higher than if that
same Jew were to marry someone from a different recognized religious category. The
statistics reflect further movement down the social hierarchy, with Jewish-Christian
relationships accounting for 10.8% of mixed relationships (0.6% of total couples), and
Jewish-Muslim marriages for 1% of interfaith marriages and (0.05% of all marriages in
Israel)147.
The intention behind the state’s deference to the religious authorities on certain
elements of personal status law is evident by the challenges faced by those in JewishArab—be they Muslim or Christian—relationships. Throughout this case study, I have
referred to a perceived demographic threat. In a classic chicken-versus-egg scenario,
nationalism/ethnic/religious attachment begets endogamy, or vice versa. Either way, there
is a commitment to ensuring that the national/ethnic/religious identity is, first, propagated
at all, and second, propagated as purely as possible. Consider this logic within the context
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of a people who view their history as one of being targeted, one forced into diaspora, for
this is at least how it is conveyed to children of Ashkenazi families. Further contextualize
a subgroup of this population as having been raised in a country constantly in conflict, a
country who was only granted recognition three years after a third of their total ethnic—
not just national—brethren were slaughtered. It’s not only nationalism, but nationalism
compounded by fear. This is the fear that dominates our collective, and, unfortunately, it
is the same fear that wins elections and allows policies that contribute to social
stratification.
Though often portraying themselves as the hegemon of Jewish authority, over half
of the global Jewish population live outside of Israel, primarily in the United States,
which by some estimates, is home to even more Jews than Israel148. Considering in terms
of percentage of the population, however, Jews remain a very small minority everywhere
outside of Israel, intermarriage amongst diasporic populations is high, standing at 52% in
the US149. This phenomenon has been viewed by many as a “racial suicide150”, one that
the Israeli state has made it their mission to prevent. Rates of intermarriage in Israel akin
to those of the United States would be devastating to the state as an entity, for how could
they claim to be the home of an ethnic population when the eventual majority of those
within the state would not belong fully to said ethnic group? Despite belonging to the
country’s current majority, interfaith marriage, particularly with Arabs, is thus seen as
“assimilation” in the sense that a high frequency of the practice would cause Jews as an
ethnoreligion have their collective identity overrun. Arabs were thus othered, demonized,
and largely shut out from Jewish society due to the sheer demographics of Palestine, as
they were the only other ethnic group in the country whose numbers were large enough to
pose a threat.
Sagiv and Yair’s channels for unification of Mizrachi and Ashkenazi Jews can be
used as a tool of analysis for ways in which the state has also furthered divisions between
Jews and Arabs as an integral part of the new pan-Jewish identity:
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Education – Whereas the socioeconomic inequality may create a segregation
between Ashkenazi and Mizrachi students in the public educational system, this is
an effect of social inequality rather than a means of its propagation. Currently,
Jewish and Arab schoolchildren are enrolled in entirely different schools, with
Arab students being all but nonexistent in Jewish schools151. As Arab schools are
disproportionately underfunded, inequality perpetuates itself in two different
ways: through a lack of educational resources which beget a lack of employment
and political power, as well as through the chronic “othering” that results when
children are not exposed to individuals from other social groups. Prejudices are
easy to pass through the generations when they are not countered in the younger
generation’s formative years. Separation becomes the foundation upon which the
youth build their standards of normalcy when it comes to social interaction, an
engrained status quo that is hard to challenge because it is not seen as something
that must be challenged at all.
To be specific, only primary and secondary education is segregated in Israel.
Universities see students from both ethnic and all religious groups, a trend that
has opponents of intermarriage worried. With more Arabs, particularly more Arab
women, attending higher education, the level of interaction between Jews and
Arabs in Israeli society is increasing152. This new exposure to the other, which
had previously been so intentionally limited, leaves more chances for interfaith
coupling.
Military Service – Israeli Jews typically complete their mandatory military service
immediately after high school. Due to the segregation of the ethnicities in the
public educational system, as well as the fact that Jews and Arabs almost always
live in different areas153, it is only during their time in the IDF that many young
Jews are exposed to Arabs for the first time, usually on opposite sides of the
conflict. This context does not necessarily inspire trust. While Arabs can serve in
the military, conscription is not required for Israeli Arabs as it is for Israeli Jews.
The reasoning for this seemingly explains itself given the very nature of the
conflict. Arab citizens belong to the same ethnonational group as the state’s single
greatest security threat, so it would be a conflict of interest, and quite possibly, a
detriment to the state, to require their service. It is because of this rationale that
the usage of mandatory military conscription in the establishment of a pan-Jewish
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identity is so profound. In using the politics of exclusion, the state was able to
capitalize on one of the few areas where it was inherently in the interest of
national security to create a division between the Arabs and the “Arab Jews”, not
so favorable nomenclature used to reference those with roots in the Arab/Islamic
World. This division, quickly cemented into normalcy, provided the foundation
for integrating the Mizrachim into “proper” Jewish culture.
Intermarriage – See this entire paper.
These divides result from a desperation of Jewish leadership to maintain majority status
within the country, as they directly impact the degree of contact Jews and non-Jews have
with one another, thus greatly decreasing the likelihood of relationship formation. With
the mass immigration of non-affiliated individuals came a large segment of the
population not considered to be Jewish, thus decreasing the percentage of “true Jews”
within the country. Both this problem and the lingering issue of Arab population growth
were solved by a greater emphasis on insularity.
For mixed couples who manage to overcome or simply negotiate the social
divides presented, there are legal parameters in place as well that cement their
relationships as inferior, given the fact that “the Supreme Court has refused to
acknowledge the existence of common law marriage in the case of an interfaith
couple154”. If the couple is comprised of a Muslim man and a Jewish or Christian woman,
they can be married under Islamic Law. Though technically a legal option, this
arrangement confuses the state. Morel Malka from the infamous case study, despite
having had converted to Islam, was still routinely identified as Jewish due to her ethnic
heritage and the religion in which she was raised, creating a dichotomy in which “her
future children would be regarded as Jewish according to halakha but treated as Muslims
by the Israeli state….[condemning] her ‘Jewish’ children to a less privileged life within
Israeli society155”. As is further supported by the case of the non-affiliated, in the
divvying up of authority to various religious jurisdictions, individuals must be
categorized according to clear-cut definitions, thus excluding anyone who fails to meet
all the prescribed criteria. While “think of the children” is a frequent cry made by
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opponents of interfaith marriage, it is precisely these opponents, not the children’s
parents, who condemn the products of mixed relationships to a legal gray area. Malka’s
depiction as Jewish in spite of her conversion to another religion is not entirely false
either, given that Jews really do not have the option to not be Jewish, even if they do not
practice Judaism as a religion. Even those who convert to other faiths are thought to
remain as part of the Jewish collective. Under halacha, in which everyone with a Jewish
mother is recognized as Jewish, Malka’s children with her Muslim husband could still be
classified according to the ethnoreligious identity of their maternal grandparents. In
theory, children resulting from marriages similar to Malka’s fall under the jurisdiction of
both the Rabbinate and the Shari’a Courts, with no concrete answer regarding the degree
of choice the children would have as to which law they are subjected. This need to belong
to one group or the other also extends beyond matters of personal status law and social
perception, encompassing questions such as which educational system the children will
be enrolled in and whether they are considered “Arab enough” to be exempt from
mandatory military conscription.
The breakdown of interfaith marriage in Israel is highly gendered as well. Women
from higher on the social hierarchy are more likely to marry men from lower levels then
men are to “marry down”156. This could be the result of two social factors. While the
status of the nonaffiliated proves that there is a differentiation between Jewish as an
ethnicity and Judaism as a religion, the vast majority of Jews in Israel are both.
According to halacha, Judaism passes along the maternal line. Perhaps because women
are seen as the ones responsible for identity propagation, it would likely be more
acceptable for many families to have their Jewish daughters marry outside the
ethnoreligious group than their Jewish sons, as the former would still produce more Jews
while the latter would produce more non-Jews. Secondly, the religious legal channels in
Israel are more suited for Jewish women to intermarry. The Rabbinate does not approve
marriage of a Jew and non-Jew regardless of the gender/religious composition of the
couple. Though exact rules on the matter vary between denomination, Christian churches
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in Israel also largely refuse to legitimize interfaith unions157. While it is forbidden under
Islamic Law for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man, Muslim men have more
freedom as the religion is seen to pass through the paternal line. Islamic Shari’a thus
recognizes marriages between Muslim men and women from faiths given a special status
in Islam, including Christianity and Judaism, which in this case are the other primary
religious groups. This caveat makes the marriage legally binding, at least under one
religious jurisdiction, giving Jewish women, but not Jewish men, the legal option to
“marry down”.
The gendered dimensions of intermarriage in Israel are even more complicated
when analyzing the reception of such unions amongst the public. Though Jewish women
are more likely to marry someone of a lower ethnoreligious social status, amongst both
Jews and Muslims, it is more common for men to marry someone outside of their
religious background158. As a non-affiliated individual is likely Jewish by ethnicity but
not by religious status, they encompass a grey area in Israel’s social hierarchy, meaning
that a man recognized as Jewish by the Rabbinate may not be considered as “marrying
down” if he weds a non-affiliated woman of Jewish ethnic origin. To reiterate, the vast
majority of interfaith marriages (84.4%) in Israel are between a Jew and a non-affiliated
individual, which would explain the discrepancy in the data. Just as there are factors that
would make it more acceptable for a woman to intermarry, there are factors that would
make it more acceptable for men, seeing as acceptability is often determined by very
specific individual contexts. Perhaps not surprisingly, as a result of this gendered
distribution of power, the responsibility of continuation of an identity has largely fallen
upon women. In Bearers of the Collective, Yuval-Davis illustrates the ways in societies
have placed the burden of continuation of the identity on women. Especially within
contexts in which there is substantial sectarian division, women are transformed simply
from women into “our women” and “their women”, commodification necessary to ensure
future demographics. Writing specifically on her country of origin, “controlling women
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and their familial status [is] of crucial importance to the Zionist movement which gives
the utmost importance to reproducing the national boundaries of the Jewish people, in
and outside Israel159”. Seeing as women are generally considered the ones responsible
for the reproduction of identity rather than just the reproduction of the species, frequent
rhetoric used to discourage and/or condemn Jewish-Arab relations involves phrases
constructed around the possession of the collectives’ females.
Such a gendered disproval, including the frequently invoked honor narrative, is
seen by the most vocal opponents to mixed marriage, notably the organizations of Lehava
and Yad L’Achim. Both are comprised of mainly Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox, male,
Mizrachi youth dedicated to preventing interfaith unions160. Lehava, whose name is
literally the acronym for “for the prevention of intermarriage in the Holy Land” in
Hebrew161, focuses primarily on preventing these relationships before they can begin by
launching a variety of campaigns to prevent what they see as the “assimilation” of the
Jewish people. Writing on Lehava specifically, though the organization’s stance is shared
by Yad L’Achim, Engelberg summarizes its logic as such:
Honor seems to be involved in Lehava’s objection to Arab men courting Jewish
women….in patriarchal nationalist thinking, when men of “the enemy” have sex
with “our daughters,” it is considered to be a terrible offense against the nation,
leading to reprimand and punishment. When Arab men date Jewish women, they
are seen by extreme right-wing Israelis as committing an act of hostility….[sic
new paragraph] when Arab men from Eastern Jerusalem go out to the Western
parts of the city seeking [Jewish] women who are not limited by the conservative
sexual standards enforced upon Arab women in East Jerusalem….They do not
bring their sisters with them to meet Jewish boys.162
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The same group responsible for the protest of the Malka-Mansour wedding mentioned in
the introduction, Lehava is also famous for plastering signs warning Arab men “don’t
[even] think of touching a Jewish girl” written in both Hebrew and Arabic163—for which
the Arabic translation is incorrectly conjugated. They are also infamous for frequently
patrolling the streets to disrupt what they consider to be predatory interactions164. But
public awareness is not the only arena in which they’re active. At the legal level, Lehava
was also successful in petitioning the Israeli National Service to prevent Jewish women
from working the night shifts at hospitals in order to keep them from coming into contact
with Arab men165. Yad L’Achim is less focused on awareness campaigns and more on
“rescuing” Jewish women they perceive as victims of their Arab partner’s abuse. While
both Lehava and Yad L’Achim offer help lines for the “victims” of these relationships,
the latter takes it a step further. At the woman’s request, the Yad L’Achim launches
armed rescue missions to extract the wife and any children she may have from her Arab
husband’s home166. At the time of this writing, they claim to have “saved” 751
individuals167. While it is doubtful such breaking, entering, trespassing, and possible
kidnapping are completely legal, “investigations have revealed that [both organizations]
have received various forms of assistance from the Israeli government…including
funding, classified information, and a convenient blind eye to some legal
transgressions168”.
The rhetoric employed by right-wing organizations is one thing, but whether the
general public believes this sexual panic narrative169 is another entirely. Regarding the
perception of interfaith marriages by the general population, as of 2009, 63% of Jewish
Israelis believed that the state should implement a system of civil marriage. While that
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figure has declined slightly 1999, in which agreement stood at 65%, the overall trend
since first survey in 1969 is one of increasing support170. This is not directly correlated to
support of intermarriage, though such a policy would provide a much easier process for
interfaith couples is a widely known fact. When talking specifically about interfaith
unions, however, the majority of Israeli society appears to be quite insular. Even
removing “the enemy” from the equation, “about two-thirds of Israeli Jews would not
support a member of their family marrying a non-Jewish American citizen of a nonJewish immigrant from the FSU [former Soviet Union]171”. When discussing
intermarriage with local populations, 97% of Jews would either be “not to” or “not at all”
comfortable with their child marrying a Muslim, with 89% expressing the same level of
discomfort with the idea of their child choosing Christian partner172. It should be noted,
however, that these figures are based upon hypothetical prospects. In all fairness to those
surveyed, it cannot be determined whether they would actually feel this way if put in such
a situation. People who have never had their beliefs challenged are unlikely to question
them on their own. If given the choice between no longer having a relationship with their
own child and abandoning someone else’s construction of ethnoreligious-nationalism, a
great deal of that 97% and 89% may choose the latter.
At the political level, debates over the establishment of a system of civil marriage
accessible to all citizens have been waging for decades, with the second and third most
popular political parties in the 2019-2020 Knesset elections both having promised to
implement civil marriage for all should they be successful in ousting Netanyahu’s
conservative Likud Party from power173. Israeli media is also divided, yet the spectrum of
stances suggests that there is a sizeable portion of the population who are not completely
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opposed to the notion of interfaith unions. Fogiel-Bijaoui categorizes media response to
the Malka-Mansour marriage into three categories: a human rights/individual freedom
discourse, a Romeo and Juliet story, and an assimilation narrative174. These categories
roughly correspond to where sources fall on the political spectrum: left-wing, central, and
right-wing. The former two appear fairly positive, however, it must be noted that the
categories were not evenly divided, so the two-versus-one majority does not necessarily
apply in this case. Hostilities towards the concept may be lessening amongst the general
Israeli population, but there is quite a big difference between not necessarily opposing
something and supporting it. Furthermore, whereas the media outlets who portrayed the
marriage in a negative light took an active role in the discouragement of such unions,
those who viewed the marriage favorably did not encourage others to enter into mixed
relationships. Given the ever-increasing ultra-Orthodox population, whether there will
more acceptance, more contempt for, or an overall plateau in social perception of the
matter going forward is currently anyone’s guess.

IV. Conclusion

The use of marriage as a means of regulating future demographics is neither new
nor unique to countries in which remnants of the millet system are still seen. The
regulation of the family, of coupling, of acceptable household structure, was and
continues to be a means of crafting the ideal future population. Systems that still delegate
authority over these questions to the religious leadership do so only because the rules
prescribed by religious doctrine(s) support the policy the state otherwise would have
chosen to implement anyway. Only, by contracting away power in such a manner, the
state also contracts away accountability as clerics do not have to worry about reelection.
Especially in the case of Israel, in which legitimacy is derived from ethnonational
principles and superiority, the corresponding religion and the codification of its tenants
are more tolerated than if the three cleavages—ethnicity, nationality, and religion—were
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not so tightly interwoven. If Jews want Israel to remain Jewish, they will tolerate the
Rabbinate’s stronghold over these select matters of personal status regardless of
individual religious belief, as fracturing the Orthodox hegemony could fragment the
Jewish population much like the Arab population has been, Through the politics of
difference, through the basing of politics on difference, segregation is the result of
endogamy and endogamy the result of segregation.
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